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THE CONTINUING RELEVANCE OF
SECTION 8(a)(2) TO THE
CONTEMPORARY WORKPLACE
Michael C. Harper*
J.

lNrn.ODUCTION

After embarking on his illustrious career as a legal academic,
Theodore St.Antoine,through a multitude of roles,including those
of scholar,teacher,administrator,pragmatic law reformer,and ar
bitrator,made innumerable contributions to the practice and devel
opment of many parts of American law. For most of us,however,
as a scholar he will be associated primarily with the system of col
lective bargaining established and encouraged by the National La
bor Relations Act (NLRA) and its progeny.1
During the first part of Professor St.Antoine's years as an aca
demic, this system continued to flourish in America, as he, along
with other legal scholars of his generation,helped explain how and
why.2 By the end of the 1970s and Professor St.Antoine's decanal
years,however,as the decline in union density spread to industries
such as construction,manufacturing,and transportation,where un
ions had been most successful,3 the erosion of the system could no
longer be ignored.4 In the 1980s and 1990s, the decline of unions
* Professor of Law, Boston University. A.B. 1970, J.D. 1973, Harvard.- Ed. I wish to
thank Boston University School of Law for supporting my research, Elly Leary for her assist
ance and inspiration, and the extraordinary reference staff of the Boston University School of
Law Library for their assistance in locating sources.
1. The NLRA, originally enacted in 1935 and alternatively named for its sponsor, Senator
Wagner, has been amended several times and is currently codified at 29 U.S. C. §§ 141-188
{1994).
2. See, e.g., Theodore J. St. Antoine, Judicial Caution and the Supreme Court's Labor
Decisions, October Term 1971, 6 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 269 {1973); Theodore J. St. Antoine,
Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: A Second Look at Enterprise Wheel and Its
Progeny, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1137 {1977); Theodore J. St. Antoine, Judicial Valour and the
Warren Court's Labor Decisions, 67 MICH. L. REv. 317 (1968); Theodore J. St. Antoine,
Secondary Boycotts and Hot Cargo: A Study in Balance ofPower, 40 U. DET. L.J. 189 (1962).
3. As explained by Joel Rogers in Divide and Conquer: Further "Reflections on the Dis
tinctive Character ofAmerican Labor Laws, " 1990 Wrs. L. REv. 1, 108-09, 115-16, before the
inflationary shock induced by the oil shortage of the early 1970s, most of the decline in union
density in the private sector in the United States could be explained by sectoral shifts away
from industries in which union density had been high into sectors, such as service and fi
nance, in which unions had not worked hard to organize.
4. It was Professor Paul Weiler, Professor St. Antoine's somewhat younger and
Canadian-bred colleague on the United Auto Workers Public Review Board, who announced
forcefully to the legal academic co=unity that the emperor of collective bargaining was
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and collective bargaining in the private sector has continued in the
shadow of expanding global competition, international capital mo
bility, and associated economic deregulation.5 In response, a range
of legal academics have argued that the labor law taught by Profes
sor St. Antoine must be significantly transformed in order to fulfill
collective bargaining's appealing promise to American workers of
having a democratically based and independent influence on their
conditions of employment.6
Although I am not certain how Professor St. Antoine assesses
these variant proposals for enhancing the opportunity of American
workers to secure some level of democracy at their workplaces, I
am confident that his sharp political sensibilities and knowledge of
labor history tell him that any proposed regulations that would aug
ment the capacity of the providers of labor to influence the terms
by which that labor is combined with the capital that it enriches
must hibernate in today's political climate. Given Professor St.
Antoine's pragmatic bent, I therefore intend to resist the tempta
tion to provide a critique (or supplementation) of such proposals. I
instead intend to focus on a particular proposal for

deregulation

rapidly losing its clothes as the National Labor Relations Board, wielding a flawed and tooth
less statute, could only look on. See Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights
to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1769 (1983) [hereinafter Weiler,
Promises to Keep]; Paul Weiler, Striking A New Balance: Freedom of Contract and the Pros
pects for Union Representation, 98 HARv. L. REv. 351 (1983). Professor Weiler relied
strongly on the empirical work of two Harvard labor economists. See generally the work
compiled in RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT Do UNIONS Do? (1984).
5. In 1996 unions represented only 11.2% of employed private nonagricultural wage and
salary workers. See BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., U.S. DEPT. OF LAB., EMPLOYMENT AND EARN
INGS 213 (1997). Only 10.2% of employed private and nonagricultural wage and salary work
ers were union members. See id. In the late 1950s, about one out of every three employed
private nonagricultural wage and salary workers was a union member. See MICHAEL C.
HARPER & SAMUEL EsTREICHER, LABOR LAW 108-09 tbl.1, 111 tbl.3 (1996).
For fuller explanations of the decline of union density, see MICHAEL GOLDFIELD, THE
DECLINE OF ORGANIZED LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES (1987); THOMAS A. KOCHAN ET
AL., THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 47-80 (ILR Press 1994)
(1986); Richard B. Freeman & Morris M. Kleiner, Employer Behavior in the Face of Union
Organizing Drives, 43 INDus. & LAB. REL. REv. 351 (1990); Rogers, supra note 3.
6. Professor Weiler proposed modest reforms in the NLRA system that would both re
duce employers' incentives and opportunities for union avoidance and also enhance union
bargaining leverage. See articles cited supra note 4. In a later book he expanded these pro
posals to include German-type works councils. See PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE
WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW (1990).
See also, e.g., REsToRING THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW (Sheldon Friedman et
al., eds., 1994) [hereinafter REsToRING THE PROMISE] ; Michael H. Gottesmann, In Despair,
Starting Over: Imagining a Labor Law for Unorganized Workers, 69 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 69
(1993); Alan Hyde, Employee Caucus: A Key Institution in the Emerging System of Employ
ment Law, 69 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 149 (1993); Joel Rogers, Reforming U.S. Labor Relations,
69 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 97 (1993).
For a particularly creative and more transformative proposal, see Mark Barenberg, De

mocracy and Domination in the Law of Workplace Cooperation: From Bureaucratic to Flexi
ble Production, 94 CoLUM. L. REv. 753, 928-83 (1994).
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that has been openly advanced in the current Congress under a
banner of claims that this deregulation would provide more oppor
tunities for American workers to influence their workplaces.
But for President Clinton's veto authority, the current Republi
can Congress indeed would have enacted legislation purporting to
provide more opportunity for employee democracy through a sig
nificant compromise of one of the NLRA's primary regulatory
commands, the prohibition of company unions in section 8(a)(2) of
the Act.7 Congressional critics of section 8(a)(2) charge that this
prohibition must be narrowed to permit nonunion employers to
implement freely new employee relations systems, most often de
nominated "employee-involvement programs," designed to make
American companies more productive and competitive. 8
Employee-involvement programs are said to enhance productivity
through greater utilization of the skills and knowledge of produc
tion workers and through an enhancement of morale and identifica
tion with the firm's competitive mission.9 Since some employee
involvement programs may be covered as labor organizations under
judicial and Labor Board interpretations of the definition of this
7. Section 8(a)(2) provides:

"It shall be an

unfair labor practice for an employer -

(2) to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organiza
tion or contribute financial or other support to it . . . ." 29 U.S. C. § 158(a)(2) (1994).
On July 30, 1996, see Clinton Vetoes TEAM Act Despite Pleas from Business for Passage,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 147, at AA-1 (July 31, 1996), President Clinton fulfilled his
promise to veto an amendment to this provision that would have provided:
That it shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under this para
graph for an employer to establish, assist, maintain, or participate in any organization or
entity of any kind, in which employees who participate to at least the same extent practi
cable as representatives of management participate, to address matters of mutual inter
est, including, but not limited to, issues of quality, productivity, efficiency, and safety and
health, and which does not have, claim, or seek authority to be the exclusive bargaining
representative of the employees or to negotiate or enter into collective bargaining agree
ments with the employer or to amend existing collective bargaining agreements between
the employer and any labor organization . • . .

Teamwork for Employees and Managers Act (TEAM Act), H.R. 743, 104th Cong. § 3 (1996).
This amendment was reintroduced in the current Congress last year. See S. 295, 105th Cong.
(1997); H.R. 634, 105th Cong. (1997).
8. The proposed "findings" contained in the TEAM Act state that "the escalating de
mands of global competition have compelled an increasing number of employers . • • to make
dramatic changes in workplace and employer-employee relationships" for "enhancing . ..
productivity and competitiveness," which are "threatened by legal interpretations of the pro
hibition against employer-dominated 'company unions."' S. 295 § 2(a)(l), (4), (7); H.R. 634
§ 2(a)(l), (4), (7).
9. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 105-12, at 2-4, 11 (1997); Statement by Congressman Steve Gun
derson Before the Employer-Employee Relations Subcommittee on the Introduction of the
Teamwork for Employees and Managers Act, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 20, at E-32 (Jan. 31,
1995) [hereinafter Gunderson Statement]; 141 CoNG. REc. S1787 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1995)
(statement of Sen. Kassebaum).
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term in the NLRA,10 such programs may be treated as illegal com
pany unions under section 8(a)(2) to the extent they are supported
by, interfered with, or dominated by firm management.11
The critics of the current section 8(a)(2) further contend that it
does not provide significant benefits in today's economy to com
pensate for the costs of discouraging productivity-enhancing and
employee-enriching employee-involvement programs. They con
tend that a company union prohibition need do no more than pro
scribe the negotiation of collective bargaining agreements with a
labor organization that is dominated or supported by the em
ployer.12 Most contemporary managers, the critics suggest, under
stand that their firms can be better served by cooperative rather
than adversarial labor relations, and that employee cooperation is
best secured through real employee involvement rather than
through the manipulative union avoidance schemes engaged in by
employers over a half century ago when section 8(a)(2) was
enacted.13
In this article I evaluate the claiins of the critics of the current
section 8(a)(2). I do so, as I believe would Professor St. Antoine,14
with an eye toward the historical development of new production
systems in America and the concomitant development of personnel
policies to fit those systems. I consider the purposes for which firm
managers seemed to establish and control employee advisory com10. Tue NLRA states:
Tue term "labor organization" means any organization of any kind, or any agency or
employee representation committee or plan, in which employees participate and which
exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning griev
ances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work.
29 U.S.C.§ 152(5); see also infra text accompanying notes 19-41.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 42-50.
12. See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher, Employee Involvement and the "Company Union" Prohi
bition: The Case for Partial Repeal of Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 125
(1994). Professor Estreicher would limit the Act's definition of a "labor organization" pro
tected from employer interference by§ 8(a)(2) to entities that bargain collectively with employers for enforceable contractual agreements. See id. at 150.
.
13. See, e.g., id. at 133-39; S. REP. No. 105-12 at 18 (1997); Gunderson Statement, supra
note 9, at d25; see also Statement of Daniel V . Yager, Labor Policy Association, before the
Commission for the Future of Worker-Management Relations (Jan. 19, 1994) 4-6 [hereinafter
Yager Testimony] (transcript on file with author). Tue Labor Policy Association, which has
been at the forefront of the lobbying effort to weaken§ 8(a)(2), represents "senior human
resources executives of more than 200 major U.S. companies." Id. at 1.
Tue TEAM Act's proposed "findings" assert that "employers who have instituted legiti
mate Employee Involvement programs have not done so to interfere with the collective bar
gaining rights guaranteed by the labor laws, as was the case in the 1930's when employers
established deceptive sham 'company unions' to avoid unionization." H.R. 634§ 2(a)(6).
14. But he would not necessarily draw the same conclusions. See Theodore St. Antoine,
The Legal and Economic Implications of Union-Management Cooperation: The Case of GM
and the UAW, in 1988 PRoc. N.Y.U. 41ST ANN. CoNF. ON LAB. § 8.04 (Bruno Stein ed.).
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mittees before passage of the NLRA and the purposes for which
managers seem to establish and control such committees in today's
economy. I conclude that these purposes have not substantially
changed. Managers before passage of the Act, like today's manag
ers, sometimes used employee-involvement programs to enhance
employee morale both by identifying the concerns of employees
and by providing employees with a process that created at least the
perception of some influence at the workplace.15 Similarly, just as
managers before passage of the Act used employee-involvement
committees directly to avert having their employees choose to be
represented by independent unions, so have managers in the mod
ern economy.16 Moreover, today's managers, like managers in ear
lier stages of American industrialization, often use employee
committees to achieve greater control over employees and their use
of time, rather than to enrich employee skills and responsibility and
thus autonomy.17

I therefore question the contention that any

changes in industrial relations or work processes should cause Con
gress to strike a different policy balance than that set in section
8(a)(2).
My skepticism concerning the claims of the critics of section
8(a)(2) is compounded by an analysis of the kind of employee in
volvement, participation, and influence on managerial policy that is
allowed in the nonunion workplace under current section 8(a)(2)
doctrine. This analysis, to which I turn first to frame the historical
review, suggests that the doctrine only minimally constrains em
ployers hoping to enhance productivity either by amplifying em
ployee voice or by .expanding utilization of employee skill and
responsibility.

Given the threats to NLRA-protected employee

rights that historical developments indicate are still posed by at
least the forms of employee participation constrained by the doc
trine, the case for diluting section 8(a)(2) thus seems particularly
weak.
II.

THE PERMISSIVE SECTION 8(A)(2)

As noted above,18 the critics of section 8(a)(2) claim that the
provision inhibits employer implementation of programs designed
to enlarge employee influence over and involvement in the setting
15. See infra text accompanying notes 73-99.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 100-28.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 138-99.
18. See supra text accompanying notes 8 & 13.
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of firm policy. Tue critics suggest that such programs not only pro
vide benefits for employees, but also enhance productivity and thus
are attractive for shareholders and their managerial agents. Under
the critics' benign view of these programs, they may enhance pro
ductivity for two reasons. First, such programs may induce employ
ees to work harder for the firm at relatively low compensation
levels because the programs both provide a low cost, but especially
valuable, process benefit for employees, and also enable employers
to understand better what other process and substantive benefits
employees would most value. Second, employee-involvement pro
grams are said to enhance firm productivity by facilitating the
greater utilization of the employees' skills, responsibility, and
human potential. By involving employees in firm management they
reduce the need for layers of middle management and mine the
lodes of expertise possessed by front line production employees.
To evaluate the affirmative case for weakening section 8(a)(2), it
is critical to analyze the extent to which current section 8(a)(2) doc
trine might inhibit the structuring of employee-involvement pro
grams to meet either of these productivity-enhancing goals. Central
to this analysis must be an appreciation of the limitations that the
Board has woven into its interpretation of the definition of labor
organization in section 2(5) of the Act.

For

if

an employee

involvement program does not create structures that can be viewed
by the Board as labor organizations, the employer creating that
program need not be concerned that its control of the program will
be treated as a violation of section 8(a)(2).
Parsing the language of section 2(5); the Board has explained
that an "entity is a labor organization

if (1)

employees participate,

(2) the organization exists, at least in part, for the purpose of 'deal
ing with' employers, and

(3)

these dealings concern 'conditions of

work,' grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, or hours of
employment."19 Tue first condition, requiring employee participa
tion, does not limit the reach of section 8(a)(2) for <employee
involvement programs because such programs by definition involve
employees. However, each of the other two conditions does signifi
cantly limit section 8(a)(2)'s scope.
Notice

first

how

the

third

condition

protects

employee

involvement structures intended to increase productivity by utiliz
ing the skills and knowledge of all, or at least more, employees in
19. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893, 894 (1993); accord Electromation,
Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990, 994 (1992), enforced, 35 F.3d 1148 (7th Cir. 1994).
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firm management. This condition insulates from the force of sec
tion 8(a)(2) any entity that does not treat the kind of topics over
which an employer must bargain with majority-supported in
dependent unions. This means that employers can freely establish
any schemes whatsoever to involve nonmanagerial employees in
decisionmaking about production process or product quality im
provements or other operational concerns such as waste manage
ment 20 as long as the employees are directed and required to focus
on how the :firm and production can be better managed rather than
on how working conditions can be improved. Employers can dele
gate any degree of managerial authority they wish to any combina
tion of purely managerial and primarily nonmanagerial employees.
Or they can establish any kind of managerial advisory committee
with any type of mixed purely managerial and primarily
nonmanagerial membership they prefer. This third condition alone
deflates the arguments of section 8(a)(2) critics that the section pre
vents employers from enriching the work experiences of employees
while improving productivity by garnering these employees' in
sights on firm management.
As some critics have noted, 21 employers establishing employee
advisory committees or employee teams with some degree of dele
gated managerial authority cannot be certain that employee mem
bers will not indulge their natural urge to attempt to utilize such
committees or teams to press their own agendas for improving their
working conditions. Employers also cannot be certain that all of
their agents will scrupulously enforce policies against allowing em
ployees to discuss working conditions and other bargaining topics in
management-influenced advisory-committee or work-team meet
ings. Thus, employer establishment of such committees or teams
could be discouraged if the Board were to interpret the third condi
tion strictly so that sporadic or intermittent lapses into discussion of
working conditions would render them subject to section 8(a)(2).
The Board, however, does not so interpret the definition of labor
organization in section 2(5).
In

Vons Grocery Co.,22 for instance, the Board held that a

"Quality Circle Group" formed for the discussion of particular op
erational issues and problems was not converted into a labor organ
ization under the NLRA simply because, after several years of
20. See Electromation, 309 N.L.R.B. at 1001-02 {Devaney, Member, concurring); 309
N.L.R.B. at 1004 (Oviatt, Member, concurring).
21. See, e.g., Estreicher, supra note 12, at 146-48.
22. 320 N.L.R.B. 53 {1995).
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acceptable focus, the group considered employee concerns about a
dress code and an accident point system, and then even developed
proposals to address these concerns.23 The Board stressed that the
employer had promptly cut off discussions of such working
condition topics after complaint from the incumbent union, and
that the isolated incident did not establish a pattern or practice of
making proposals to management on how working conditions
should be improved.24
The critics of section 8(a)(2) might retort that some employers
want to gain the benefits of employee self-management on person
nel issues, like scheduling of overtime, approval of sick leave, and
discipline assessment, as well as on production and quality mainte
nance issues. Some employers might feel that their front line pro
duction employees have the most to ·contribute to firm management
through the control of their fellow employees. These employers
also might argue that these employees would feel even more em
powered by having some authority over personnel issues than they
would by having authority over production decisions.
It is true that the third condition in the definition of labor organ
ization would not offer insulation from section 8(a)(2) for any shar
ing of managerial authority over personnel issues w i t h
nonmanagerial employees covered b y the NLRA. However, the
second condition in the definition, the requirement that any entity
must "deal with" the employer in order to be covered as a labor
organization under the Act, does enable an employer actually to
delegate to teams or committees of NLRA-covered employees a
significant level of authority over issues that would be subject to
collective bargaining.
This condition was more fully formulated by the Board in its

1993

decision in

E.L du Pont de Nemours & Co.25 The du Pont
NLRB v.

Board acknowledged the Supreme Court's holding in

See 320 N.L.RB. at 54.
24. See also Stoody Co. Div. of Thermadyne, Inc., 320 N.L.R.B. 18 {1995) (single meeting
of committee formed for limited purpose of revising employee handbook to conform to cur
rent practices did not constitute a "pattern or practice" of making proposals on working
conditions simply because proposals on vacation time were discussed in contravention of
limited purpose).
25. 311 N.L.R.B. 893 (1993). This decision seems to have been intended to address the
regulation of modem employee involvement programs in the union workplace as the more
celebrated Electromation, 309 N.L.R.B. 990, decision was to have addressed the regulation of
these programs in the nonunion workplace. But the du Pont decision's formulation of the
definition of labor organization has been more quoted and relied upon by the Board in its
recent nonunion workplace, as well as union workplace,§ 8{a)(2) cases. The Von's Grocery
decision discussed above, supra text accompanying note 22, is an example.
23.
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Cabot Carbon Co.26 that the "dealing with"phrase in section 2(5)
encompasses more than the process of collective bargaining, during
which the parties "seek to compromise their differences and arrive
at an agreement."27 The Board stressed, however, that "dealing
with" nonetheless requires that there be some "bilateral mecha
nism"between the employees and management that would at least
"ordinarily entail[ ] a pattern or practice in which a group of em
ployees, over time, makes proposals to management [and] manage
ment responds to these proposals by acceptance or rejection by
word or deed."28 The Board further stated that "[i]f the evidence
establishes such a pattern or practice . . . the element of dealing is
present. However,

if there are only isolated instances in which

the

group makes ad hoc proposals to management ... the element of
dealing is missing. "29
The "isolated instances"qualification, in tandem with the third
condition as discussed above, 30 ensures that the Board finds no sec
tion 8(a)(2) violation in cases like

Von's Grocery where there are

only isolated proposals on issues that could be viewed as concerning
working conditions. However, the requirement that there be "pro
posals" that are accepted or rejected by management suggests an
even more important insulating barrier. As the Board recognizes,
the requirement enables employers to delegate to employees any
kind of managerial authority, whether or not related to working
conditions, as long as the delegation is real and not simply formal.
As explained by the Board in

du Pont, there is no "dealing with"if

a committee of employees protected by the Act has the "power to
decide matters for itself, rather than simply [to] make proposals to
management," whether that management is formally within or
without the committee. 31
Similarly, in Electromation the Board stressed that "an organi
zation whose purpose is limited to performing essentially a manage
rial or adjudicative function is not a labor organization under
Section 2(5)."32 The Board cited three 1977 decisions for this prop26. 360 U.S. 203 (1959).
27. Du Pont, 311 N.L.R.B. at 894.
28. Du Pont, 311 N.L.R.B. at 894.
29. Du Pont, 311 N.L.R.B. at 894.
30. See supra text accompanying notes 20-24.
31. Du Pont, 311 N.L.R.B. at 895.
32. Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990, 995 (1992), enforced, 35 F.3d 1148 (7th Cir.
1994). Members Devaney and Oviatt also stressed this point in their separate concurring
opinions in Electromation. See 309 N.L.R.B. at 1002 (Devaney, Member, concurring); 309
N.L.R.B. at 1004 (Oviatt, Member, concurring).
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osition, which together signaled the Board's early expressed intent
to ensure that sincere attempts by progressive employers to dele
gate real authority to employees not be impeded by section 8(a)(2).
In two of these cases the Board refused to treat as labor organiza
tions committees granted actual authority to resolve employee com
plaints or grievances.33 In the third case the Board upheld an
Administrative Law Judge's finding that work teams established by
an employer were not labor organizations, even though the teams
made decisions on such personnel topics as "job assignments to in
dividual team members," "job rotations," and "overtime among
team members."34 The Board in this last case adopted the Judge's
findings that the teams' power to regulate their own members'
working conditions reflected not "dealings" with management, but
rather delegated authority as part of the workers' duties.
The Board continues to adhere consistently to the limitation on
the meaning of "dealing with" established by these three cases. For
instance,

in

Keeler Brass, the Board treated an employer

established grievance committee as a labor organization only after
concluding that it, unlike the committees in the first two

1977

cases,35 could not "resolve grievances without further recourse to
the employer."36 The

Keeler Brass committee, the Board stressed,

could only recommend or propose some level of discipline to man
agement for management's rejection or acceptance.37
The distinction between delegated authority to decide and lim
ited authority only to recommend, moreover, should not be difficult

for employers to understand. In order to insulate self-managing
work teams of NLRA-protected employees from section 8(a)(2)

challenges, employers need only allow the protected �mployees' de
cisions on subjects appropriate for collective bargaining to be im
plemented without review by managers. This qualification need not
impede a firm maintaining ultimate hierarchical control. Like any
managerial decisions made at any level of a firm, the decisions of
self-managing teams can be reversed by higher level management
without causing section 8(a)(2) exposure. They simply must be able
to become effective before being considered for reversal. They
33. See Mercy-Memorial Hosp., 231 N.L.R.B. 1108 (1977); John Ascuaga's Nuggett, 230
N.L.R.B. 275, 276 (19 77).
34. General Foods Corp., 231 N.L.R.B. 1232, 1233 (1977).
35. See cases cited supra note 33.
36. See Keeler Brass Automotive Group, 317 N.L.R.B. 1110, 1114 (1995).
3 7. See Keeler, 317 N.L.R.B. at 1114.
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must, in other words, be more than proposals or recommendations
for management's rejection or acceptance.
The "dealing with," or second, condition in the NLRA's defini
tion of labor organization also should ensure that employers are
able to attempt to enhance employee morale by offering their em
ployees the opportunity to voice their most salient concerns about
their own working conditions. The Board in

du Pont, after elabo

rating the definition of "dealing with" quoted above, distinguished
the "group action" required by this definition from the "individual
communication" that it does not cover.38 In so doing, it noted at
least three "safe havens" that employers can be assured constitute
only mechanisms for establishing lines of communication.
First, it noted that "brainstorming" sessions where employees
are encouraged to present "a whole host of ideas," rather than de
velop particular group proposals, do not constitute an entity that
facilitates employees as a collectivity "dealing with" management.39
Such sessions are instead a means by which management can deter
mine the concerns and priorities of individual employees. Similarly,
employers, without "dealing with" their employees as a collectivity,
can establish written channels for communication, such as a "sug
gestion box," by which "employees make specific proposals to man
agement ... individually and not as a group."4° Finally, the Board
stated that employee committees do not deal with an employer if
they only provide its management with information, presumably in
cluding the thoughts and ideas of individual employees, but do not
advance group proposals.41
38. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. 893, 894 {1993).
39.
40.

Du Pont, 311 N.L.R.B. at 894.
Du Pont, 311 N.L.R.B. at 894.
See du Pont, 311 N.L.R.B. at 894; see also Sears,

41.
Roebuck and Co., 274 N.L.R.B. 230,
244 {1985) {finding that the "communications committee" on which all employees served on
a rotating basis was not a labor organization because employees only provided individual
input to management).
The du Pont Board's distinction of communication with individual employees from group
action or the conveyance of collective proposals, along with its explanation that "dealing
with" can occur on, as well as outside, an employee committee, 311 N.L.R.B. at 894-95, ex
plains the limited sense that the "dealing with" condition requires that an employee commit
tee or team must be "representative" of other employees in order to be treated as a "labor
organization." See also Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. 990, 994 {1992), enforced, 35 F.3d
1148 {7th Cir. 1994) (suggesting that being representative is a fourth condition of coverage as
a labor organization). Employers should not assume that language in Electromation, or in
General Foods, see supra note 34 and accompanying text, frees management to control in any
fashion any employee-involvement program that includes all employees as participants,
rather than just a representative sample. When a committee or team of front-line employees
develops proposals to improve working conditions and then has some member of the com
mittee, whether or not a managerial employee, convey these proposals to more senior man
agers, the conveyer becomes a representative of the group. Even when group proposals are
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Furthermore,the Board has clearly signaled in its contemporary
cases that section 8(a)(2) need not restrict even employers who
want their employees to have the opportunity to voice collective
proposals on topics appropriate for bargaining through structures
that would therefore be treated as labor organizations. In Electro
mation the Board stressed that Senator Wagner,the primary spon
sor of the NLRA in general and section 8(a)(2) in particular,"made
a distinction . . . between interference and minimal conduct 'merely suggesting to ...employees that they organize a union or
committee' - that the nation's experience had shown did not rob
employees of their right to a representative of their own choos
ing." 4 2 The question of whether an employer has violated section
8(a)(2) with interference,domination,or support of a labor organi
zation,in Senator Wagner's view,should turn on whether "an em
ployee organization is entirely the agency of the workers." 4 3
This suggests,at the least,that an "employer should not be pe
nalized for merely suggesting to his employees that they organize a
union or a committee " 4 4 that is independent of any outside union.
Moreover,if this were not the intent of Senator Wagner,it certainly
must have been the intent of the Taft-Hartley Congress,which af
firmed in section 8(c) of the Act that nonthreatening speech cannot
alone constitute an unfair labor practice.4 5 This provision should
make clear that an employer is free to explain to its employees not
only its opposition to outside unions in general,but also its support
of a particular kind of independent internal employee
organization.4 6
Admittedly,it is not fully clear how much more than verbal en
couragement section 8(a)(2) allows an employer to provide employ
ees who may wish to influence their workplace through some kind
of committee that is independent of outside unions as well as the
employer. However,as long as the employer allows the employee
committees to meet outside the presence of management,to control
only made to a management representative on the committee for the representative's accept
ance or rejection by word or by deed, however, the individual employees are represented by
the group proposal, and are not directly co=unicating with management. See du Pont, 311
N.L.R.B. at 895.
42. Electromation, 309 N.L.R.B. at 993-94.
43. Electromation, 309 N.L.R.B. at 994.
44. Electromation, 309 N.L.R.B. at 993.
45. See 29 U.S.C. 158(c) (1994).
46. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618 (1969) ("[A] n employer is free to
communicate to his employees any of his general views about unionism or any of his specific
views about a particular union, so long as the co=unications do not contain a 'threat of
reprisal or force or promise of benefit."').
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their own agendas and structure,and to conduct independent elec
tions to select their members,the employer should be able to allow
the committees to meet on plant property during work time and to
present proposals for management's acceptance or rejection.47
That seems to be the view of recent NLRB Chairman Gould.48 The
Board has never held otherwise; and given the general tendency of
the courts to be even less strict interpreting section 8(a)(2) than has
the Board,49 no employer should fear some sudden invigoration of
the section against an employer's consideration of proposals from
truly independent employee committees that it has encouraged its
employees to form.so
In sum,section 8(a)(2) as interpreted by the Board proscribes
only a narrow range of clearly defined employee-involvement pro
grams. It prohibits only employee committees or teams: (1) that
are in some substantial way under employer control or dependent
on employer support and (2) that convey to management for pre
implementation acceptance or rejection proposals
sent some collectivity of employees

(4)

(3)

that repre

and that concern personnel

topics encompassed by the definition of labor organization in sec
tion 2(5) of the Act.si
47. But they could not present a proposal for negotiation of an agreement in the manner
of collective bargaining. See International Ladies' Garment Workers Union v. NLRB, 366
U.S. 731 (1961) (upholding§ 8(a)(2) violation where employer recognized independent, but
nonmajority union as collective bargaining agent).
48. See, e. g., Keeler Brass Automotive Group, 317 N.L.R.B. 1110, 1118-19 (1995) (con
curring opinion); see also William B. Gould IV, Employee Participation and Labor Policy:
Why the TEAM Act Should Be Defeated and the National Labor Relations Act Amended, 30
CREIGHTON L. REv. 3 (1996).
49. See, e.g., NLRB v. Peninsula Gen. Hosp. Med. Ctr., 36 F.3d 1262 (4th Cir. 1994);
NLRB v. Northeastern Univ., 601 F.2d 1208 (1st Cir. 1979); Hertzka & Knowles v. NLRB,
503 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1974); Modern Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1967);
Chicago Rawhide Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 221 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1955). At least the Sixth Circuit
has also interpreted the "dealing with" condition in § 2(5) to require more to qualify as a
"labor organization" than has the Board or probably the Supreme Court in Cabot Carbon.
See Airstream, Inc. v. NLRB, 877 F.2d 1291 (6th Cir. 1989); NLRB v. Streamway Div. of
Scott & Fetzer Co., 691 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1982).
50. See also Electromation, Inc. v. NLRB, 35 F.3d 1148, 1170 (7th Cir. 1994) ("(T]he
principal distinction between an independent labor organization and an employer-dominated
organization lies in the unfettered power of the independent organization to determine its
own actions.").
51. The minimal impact on employee-involvement programs of§ 8(a)(2) as interpreted
by the Board is confirmed by James R. Rundle's comprehensive study of all§ 8(a)(2) cases
before the Board during the period from 1972 to 1993. See James R. Rundle, The Debate
over the Ban on Employer-Dominated Labor Organizations: What ls the Evidence?, in
REsToR!NG THE PROMISE, supra note 6. Rundle found only two cases in this twenty-two year
period "in which there were no other ULPs found and the committee that was disestablished
had not been established in the course of a union organizing campaign." Id. at 166 (emphasis
mnitted). One of those cases was Electromation, where the employer formed employee com
Inittees that treated only personnel concerns that had nothing to do with product quality or
productivity issues or real employee empowerment, just before the beginning of a union cam-
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To be sure, critics of section 8(a)(2) can still argue that even
such a permissive section 8(a)(2) restrains employers who wish to
obtain collective employee input on personnel issues, but who are
unwilling either

(1)

to empower employees who are not primarily

managerial to participate in actual managerial decisionmaking, or
(2) to encourage the existence of truly independent employee com
mittees that could develop into oppositional forces or even in
dependent unions seeking collective bargaining authority.

This

more limited argument, however, does not support the claim that
employee-involvement programs are generally threatened by the
current section 8(a)(2). Rather, the question reduces to whether
the narrow kind of management-controlled employee involvement
that section 8(a)(2) does inhibit might be more attractive to em
ployers today than the kinds of programs section 8(a)(2) permits,
primarily because the management-controlled programs better
serve asserted productivity- and participation-enhancing goals, or
rather because these management-controlled programs can be bet
ter utilized to discourage what the NLRA was intended to protect
- collective bargaining and "other concerted activities" for em
ployee "mutual aid or protection."52
This question can be answered in part through logical analysis.
The kind of management-controlled programs that the Board inter
prets section 8(a)(2) to prohibit at least pose a greater risk of ma
nipulation of employees to inhibit their choice of the independent
collective action protected by the NLRA. Unlike channels for the
expression of the views and proposals of individual employees, a
committee that can make collective employee proposals on person
nel issues for management's acceptance or rejection can be
presented to employees as an alternative to the collective voice
promised by independent unions.53 Even without much managerial
paign. The other case involved a committee that circumvented an incumbent union by the
consideration of personnel grievances. See Alta Bates Hosp., 226 N.L.R.B. 485 (1976); see
also Rundle, supra, in REsroRING THE PROMISE, supra note 6, at 166-73. The ubiquity of
unions in§ 8{a){2) cases also reflects the unlikelihood of individual employees filing unfair
labor practice complaints with the Board in the absence of protection by an independent
union.
52. 29 u.s.c. § 157 {1994).
53. Some commentators have suggested that employee representational schemes are like
any other benefits, such as wage bonuses or pension plans, which employers can provide their
employees to reduce their desire to be represented by a union. See, e.g., WEILER, supra note
6, at 214. Employee representation schemes, unlike substantive econmnic benefits, however,
are a direct procedural alternative to collective bargaining and the channel for a collective
employee voice that it provides. Furthermore, substantive benefits cannot be used as fora for
the manipulation, division, and isolation of employees, as can employee representational
schemes. See infra text accompanying note 57.
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control, at least over the short run such a committee can pose psy
chological and practical barriers to the development of independent
unions. Psychologically employees may perceive less of a need for
independent collective bargaining where an employer offers chan
nels through which employees may convey collective proposals.s4
Practically many employees with leadership skills will have their or
ganizational energies diverted into such channels.
In the longer run, as employees come to understand the limita
tions on their influence, employer-established or -encouraged com
mittees that have developed independent of continuing managerial
control can further develop into real labor organizations that may
claim the authority to bargain collectively with management.ss
Nonetheless, continuing managerial control of employee commit
tees not only can ensure the abortion of any such developments, but
also can provide further opportunities for managerial manipulation
of employees away from independent collective action.s6 The dis
cussion of personnel issues in management-controlled committees
can be utilized to identify and highlight issues that divide groups of
employees. Such discussions also may be directed to isolate and
embarrass potentially disruptive dissident employees who could
lead some independent employee resistance to managerial priori
ties. Perhaps most important, sophisticated management that re
mains in control of the agenda and proposal development of
54. See Barenberg, supra note 6, at 804-07 (noting application of this theory in early
Labor Board§ 8(a)(2) cases).
55. American workers have shown themselves capable of taking control of plans origi
nally encouraged by employers, at least where those plans were not under the continuing
control of management. See, e. g., IRVING BERNSTEIN, THE TURBULENT YEARS 455-57 (1970)
(workers at U.S. Steel); John N. Schacht, Toward Industrial Unionism: Bell Telephone Work
ers and Company Unions, 16 LAB. HIST. 5-36 (1975); see also Sanford M. Jacoby, Current
Prospects for Employee Representation in the U.S.: Old Wine in New Bottles?, 16 J. LAB. REs.
387 (1995) (history of company unions being turned into independent unions). Professor
Barenberg's brilliant, exhaustive application of social science insights to explain the possible
effects of employee-participation schemes, see Barenberg, supra note 6, also includes a cata
logue of theories (under such descriptive sobriquets as "whetting the appetite" and "runaway
legitimation") to explain why company unions under certain conditions may encourage the
development of independent unions. See id. at 831-35.
56. Section 8(a)(2) does not rest on some general theory of "false consciousness" of
American workers. See Estreicher, supra note 12, at 131-32. Section 8(a)(2) instead was
intended to provide prophylactic protection against managerial manipulation. See Mark
Barenberg, The Political Economy of the Wagner Act: Power, Symbol, and Workplace
Cooperation, 106 HAR.v. L. REv. 1379, 1456-59 (1993) (noting legislative history that indi
cates Senator Wagner's concern with managerial penetration of workplace to distort em
ployee deliberation, as well as employee interest distortion); see also Michael C. Harper,
Reconciling Collective Bargaining with Employee Supervision of Management, 137 U. PA. L.
REv. 1, 6-9 (1988) (detailing legislative history and stressing prophylactic protection);
Thomas C. Kohler, Models of Worker Participation: The Uncertain Significance of Section
8(a)(2), 27 B.C. L. REv. 499, 530-34 (1986) (detailing legislative history and stressing statu
tory choice of autonomous employee selection of representatives).
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employee committees can continue to create the illusion of respon
siveness to employee voice, while attempting to orchestrate that
voice to make proposals in tune with management.57
Where the employee committees or teams are delegated real au
thority by management, however, the opportunity for managerial
manipulation is reduced just as the actual influence of the employ
ees over firm policy is enhanced. Employees should be able to un
derstand more easily their actual level of authority in the firm

if

they are granted some reviewable discretion to make managerial
decisions for the firm, rather than to make proposals on behalf of
employee interests for managerial consideration. A managerial re
versal of a work team decision directly announces limitations on the
team's authority, while the rejection of a collective employee pro
posal may be presented with the promise of future compromise.
Employees can appreciate that they are being asked to help direct
the firm for the general success of the firm, rather than for the em
ployees' particular interests. Furthermore, managerial agents on
employee work teams must be constrained to pay attention primar
ily to production concerns, rather than to the control of personnel,
when actual managerial decisions.are being made by the teams.
Therefore, all of the conditions placed by the Board on the
reach of section 8(a)(2) seem appropriately designed to ensure inhi
bition of only that form of employee involvement that carries the
most risk of managerial discouragement of NLRA-protected collec
tive action.58 Any argument that section 8(a)(2) nonetheless must
be diluted to permit even what it now prohibits must rest on the
empirical claim that the incentives to use employee involvement
programs in today's economy, unlike the incentives that motivated
managers in the first half of the century, primarily are benign. The
critics of section 8(a)(2) have the burden of establishing that some
historical development or developments, in technology, in indus
trial processes, or in human relations theories, have antiquated the
empirical assumptions underlying section 8(a)(2). My own quick
57. See infra text accompanying notes 115-28; see also Barenberg, supra note 6, at 786-89
(explaining how company-controlled unions can facilitate coercion and manipulation of
employees).
58. Thus, management attorney and past Labor Board Chairman Edward B. Miller candidly acknowledged after the Board's decisions in Electromation and du Pont:
It is indeed possible to have effective programs . . . in both union and non-union compa
nies without the necessity of any change in current Jaw. . . . While I represent manage
ment, I do not kid myself. . . If section 8(a)(2) were to be repealed, I have no doubt that
in not too many months or years sham company unions would again recur.
Former NLRB Chairman Miller Calls Electromation Problem "Myth", Daily Lab. Rep.
{BNA) No. 201, at AS (Oct. 20, 1993).
.
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review of the history of this century casts doubt on the ability of the
critics to carry this burden.
III.

A BRAVE NEW WORLD? - T HE HISTORICAL AND
CONTEMPORARY USE OF
EMPLOYEE-lNvOLVEMENT PROGRAMS

As explained above,59 critics of section 8(a)(2) claim that, in
contrast to the period during which section 8(a)(2) was enacted,
employers today most often establish committees to facilitate the
communication of employees' views to management not to discour
age employees from choosing independent unions, or more gener
ally to weaken employee autonomy, but rather to increase the
employees' productivity by deepening their commitment to the pro
duction enterprise and by utilizing employees' insights on how pro
duction can be most efficient and consistent. My survey of the
modem economy suggests that this contrast is overdrawn. Modern
employers in America continue to utilize involvement programs to
discourage unions and employee autonomy, often in more sophisti
cated and effective ways than the employers of the thirties. More
over, the industrial relations theory that management-controlled
employee-involvement programs can enhance the productivity of
workers by deepening their commitment and loyalty to the goals of
the firm for which they work antedates the NLRA and was rejected
as a rationale for narrowing section 8(a)(2).60
More important, the modern use of employee-involvement pro
grams often represents an application of a "human relations" per
sonnel theory for how management can obtain greater control over
workers' time, which was first articulated before passage of the
NLRA and which has been further developed in the last two de
cades to assist in the implementation of the much heralded
Japanese "lean production" system. This system, far from offering
American workers greater control over their work and enriched
jobs, provides management with the tools to obtain minute control
over every movement of front-line workers and to demand from
them more intense and stressful performance. Utilization of some
of these tools, however, depends upon the extraction of both front
line employee commitment and knowledge about the production
process. Management-controlled employee-involvement programs,
59. See supra text accompanying notes 8-13.
60. See Owen E. Herrnstadt, Section 8(a)(2) of the N.L.R.A.: The Debate, 48 LAB. L.J.
98, 103-06 {1997); Kohler, supra note 56 at 532-33.
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therefore, may be attractive to employers, not only to help avert
independent unions, but also to avert other forms of employee
resistance to the implementation of a system that ultimately makes
work more difficult for employees. Far from offering employees
half of the loaf of independent unions, management-controlled pro
grams thus may threaten to place employees in

a

position worse

than that of having no formal representational system.
The actual achievement of many of the purported goals of em
ployee involvement - specifically, jobs requiring enhanced skills
and more individual and collective employee control over work
processes - is desirable, both for American workers in particular
and for the American economy in general. Absent the emergence
of an international labor movement that 'can exercise some control
over global labor markets, skill enhancement may offer American
workers their only real chance to achieve job security and some
wage premium over that which can be extracted in less developed,
and less democratic, countries. Furthermore, notwithstanding the
use of employee-involvement programs by many employers to
avoid or erode unions or to implement more oppressive production
processes, some programs may provide real skill enhancement and
power to American workers.
The best preliminary evidence, some of it from outside the
United States, however, indicates that the use of employee commit
tees for skill enhancement and real worker job control is much
more likely where strong, independent unions have been able to
convince management to employ new technology for these pur
poses. Retaining a viable section 8(a)(2) to help protect the devel
opment

of unions

thus

is

likely to

encourage,

rather

than

discourage, new forms of worker empowerment. Furthermore, the
narrowly framed section 8(a)(2) described above allows nonunion
employers to transfer real decisionmaking authority to their em
ployees, while only inhibiting illusory and manipulative participa
tion programs designed to facilitate implementation of the more
oppressive forms of the Japanese lean production system.

A.

The Critics' Story

Most contemporary critics base their case against section 8(a) (2)
on the claim that the employee-involvement programs established
and administered by modem employers are fundamentally different
in purpose and effect from the company unions that were the origi-
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nal targets of the section.61 Congress enacted section 8(a)(2) , the
story runs, to counter the efforts of employers in the thirties to en
gage in 'sham collective bargaining' with management-controlled
employee organizations designed to thwart the burgeoning union
organization of the time. Today, the critics claim, employers most
often establish and administer employee committees that might be
prohibited by a strict reading of section 8(a)(2) in order to increase
the productivity of employees, rather than to use fake collective
bargaining to avert real bargaining through independent unions.
Enlightened modem employers are said to understand that workers
may be more easily convinced that their interests are consonant
with those of the firm and thus more productive when the workers
feel they have some opportunity to influence the conditions of their
work. Modem employers are also said to be more likely than their
predecessors to understand that workers engaged in production
may possess better knowledge of how to make the production pro
cess more efficient. Modem employee-involvement programs are
thus claimed to be no more than an effort by sensitive employers to
make the firm's command structure less hierarchical.
Proponents of contemporary employee-involvement programs
contend that they are part of a transformation of American produc
tion processes from the system of scientific management spawned
61. This story, in whole or in part, has been recounted by numerous employer representa
tives in testimony before Congressional Committees considering the TEAM legislation and
before the Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations, created by Presi
dent Clinton. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 105-12, at 2-4 (1997); Yager Testimony, supra note 13;
Statement of Richard A. Beaumont, President of Organization Resources Counselors, Inc.,
Management Consultants, before the Commission for the Future of Worker-Management
Relations, Jan. 19, 1994 (on file with author).
All , or at least part, of this story also has now been rehearsed in numerous law and busi
ness review articles and notes. See, e. g., Jon Blumenthal, Remedying Electromation, Inc. v.
NLRB and its Progeny: The Future of Employee Participation Programs, 5 KAN. J.L. & Pun.
PoLY. 193 (1996); Estreicher, supra note 12, at 129-39; Charles C. Jackson, An Alternative to
Unionization and the Wholly Unorganized Shop: A Legal Basis for Sanctioning Joint
Employer-Employee Committees and Increasing Employee Free Choice, 28 SYRACUSE L.
REv. 809 (1977); Nancy K. Kubasek et al., Putting Worker-Management Relations in Context:
Why Employee Representational Choice Needs Greater Protection in Reform of Section
8(a)(2) of the NLRA, 34 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 53 {1997); Marleen A. O'Connor, The Human
Capital Era: Reconceptualizing Corporate Law to Facilitate Labor-Management Cooperation,
78 CORNELL L. REv. 901 {1993); Anna S. Rominger, Rethinking the Paradigm: Can the Wag
ner Act and Labor-Management Cooperation Coexist?, 8 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 159 (1996); Jo
seph B. Ryan, The Encouragement of Labor-Management Cooperation: Improving American
Productivity Through Revision of the National Labor Relations Act, 40 UCLA L. REv. 571
(1992); Shaun G. Clarke, Note, Rethinking the Adversarial Model in Labor Relations: An
Argument for Repeal of Section 8(a)(2), 96 YALE L.J. 2021 {1987); Note, Participatory Man
agement Under Sections 2(5) and 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act, 83 MICH. L.
REv. 1736 (1985). For a more balanced view, see Rafael Gely, Whose Team Are You On?
My Team or My TEAM?: The NLRA's Section 8(a)(2) and the TEAM Act, 49 RUTGERS L.
REv. 323 (1997).
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in the 1920s by the theories of Frederick Taylor.62 The essential
aspects of Taylorism are said to be: :first, the separation of the intel
lectual work of production conception and design from the manual
work of production execution; and second, the breaking down of
this execution into a series of separable, easily learned repetitive
work steps specified by industrial engineers. In this system produc
tion workers are simply assigned one or more of these repetitive
tasks by foremen; they are not allowed to determine how best to
complete work for which they are responsible. The pace of their
work is controlled by the speed of an assembly line or by individual
quotas based on time and motion studies of workers by production
engineer specialists.
Some tellers of this story view industrial unionism, as it devel
oped in the middle of this century, as a response to a hierarchical
production system defined by Taylorism. Unions helped workers
moderate the speed and intensity of production. They did so in part
by creating a culture of solidarity among workers to restrict man
agement's ability to create competition among workers based on
achieving rewards from supervisors. They also protected workers
from supervisors' favoritism by negotiating detailed collective bar
gaining agreements that not only required just cause for discipline,
but also defined workers' rights to particular jobs on the basis of
seniority. Unions, however, basically accepted management's con
trol over the delineation of job tasks. The unions only insisted that
the jobs be narrowly classified so that seniority, rather than supervi
sory discretion, could govern job assignment and thus career ad
vancement. As American mass production thrived in a world of
limited international competition and expanding demand into the
1960s, unions also could successfully obtain for their members con
tinual increases in wages and other benefits as part of their ongoing
bargain with a management that retained control of production
decisions.63
Some proponents of modem employee-involvement programs
explain the proliferation of such programs in the United States in
the last two decades as part of the breakdown of Fordist mass pro
duction. Mass production in the United States, the story continues,
has been challenged by the saturation of world consumer markets
62. For treatments of Taylor, see ROBERT KAN!GEL, THE ONE BEST WAY (1997);
NELSON, FREDERICK W. TAYLOR AND THE RISE OF SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT
(1980).
63. See THOMAS A. KoCHAN ET AL., THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS 28-29 (1986); MicHAEL J. P10RE & CHARLES F. SABEL, THE SECOND !Nous.
TRIAL DIVIDE (1984). '
DANIEL
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for standardized goods and services, by the emergence of new for
eign competitors, especially in the Asian rim, and by the adoption
by some of these competitors of more efficient production
processes.64 Critics of section 8(a)(2) contend that in order to meet
this new international competition employers of American workers
also have had to adopt new production processes that may break
down the divisions between management and labor in ways that at
least in a nonunion workplace could be challenged under section
8(a)(2), but which nonetheless are ultimately enriching for the
workers.65
These new production processes, it is said, depart from Taylor
ism and mass production in a number of significant ways, some of
which have been made possible by technological advances primarily
associated with computers.66 Machines no longer need to be per
manently dedicated to the production of particular goods, but are
now able to be reprogrammed to adapt to rapidly changing market
demand and the search for new market niches. To meet the flexibil
ity of their machines, workers also must become flexible. They
must be able and willing to change the particular work they do and
the machines they operate as market demand shifts. This flexibility
requires some degree of worker influence over the production pro
cess, because only workers directly involved in production can un
derstand how to make quick readjustments. It also requires a
broadening and deepening of the skills of production workers, as
workers are required to perform multiple tasks, to understand the
capabilities of the machines they operate, and to be able to adjust
the machines' operation.
Production processes are not to be rigidly set even for those
firms continuing to use assembly lines for large markets; instead
workers must cooperate with management in a continuous effort to
make production more efficient and flexible. The contribution of
workers directly involved in production is critical to achieve such
improvements because only those who actually do production work
fully understand the need for each detailed motion that they make.
Try as they might, Taylorist industrial engineers could not deter
mine the most efficient modes of production by having specialists
64. See, e.g., BARRY BLUESTONE & IRVING BLUESTONE, NEGOTIATING TiiE FUTURE 6079 (1992).
65. See, e.g., Estreicher, supra note 12, at 133-39.

66. See, e.g., MARTIN KENNEY & RICHARD FLORIDA, BEYOND MAss PRODUCTION
(1993); PIORE & SABEL, supra note 63; JAMES P. WOMACK ET AL., THE MACHINE THAT
CHANGED TiiE WORLD (1990).
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conduct time and motion studies without the active cooperation of
the workers being studied.
Proponents of employee involvement also contend that such in
volvement can make firms more efficient by substituting collective
employee self regulation for wasteful layers of management hierar
chy. New production processes may require employees to set up
and make at least minor repairs on their own machines. They also
may require production employees to do inspections on the work of
other employees with whom they work. Groups or teams of em
ployees may even allocate jobs and assign overtime between team
members. Teams may have a role in recommending discipline, pro
motions, or even hiring or new admissions into the team.
All of these developments are viewed by the critics of section
8(a)(2) as beneficial for American workers, not only because they
may enhance the workers' job security and compensation by en
abling the firms for which they work to compete more effectively in
product markets, but also because the new processes directly enrich
the jobs of the workers. Workers feel better about their work when
they have some opportunity to influence its content, rather than
simply taking orders from supervisors. Furthermore, it is said,
these programs provide workers with the satisfaction of feeling that
they understand and have made an intellectual contribution to the
production process of which they are a part. This conventional de
scription of the impact of recent production modifications also as
sumes that these modifications deepen as well as broaden the skills
of the workers they touch, thus presumably making work more en
gaging as well as more stimulating.67
B.

Continuities with the Past

Although aspects of the critics' story are accurate, it nonetheless
exaggerates the contrast between the "company union" movement
that preceded the Wagner Act and the employee-involvement
movement that emerged in the 1970s. This contrast misrepresents
both the past and the present.
It misrepresents the past by simplifying the purpose and func
tion of pre-Act "employee representation plans" or "works coun
cils" - what company unions were called at the time by their
67. See, e. g., Ryan, supra note 61, at 579-88; Madelyn Carol Squire, Reality or Myth: Par
ticipatory Programs and Workplace Democracy
A Proposal For A Different Role for Un
ions, 23 STETSON L. REv. 139, 150-52 (1993).
-
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proponents.68 Contemporary critics of section 8(a)(2) are correct to
note that company unions were condemned by the Act primarily
because Senator Wagner and his allies viewed them for good reason
as a major impediment to the development of independent un
ions.69 The attention given company unions, and to section 8(a)(2),
in the legislative debates on the Wagner Act reflected their prolifer
ation as an alternative to independent unions in the early 1930s,70
especially after the National Industrial Recovery Act provided that
employees had "the right to organize and bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing. "71 However, in at
tempting to create a false contrast with modern employee
involvement programs, today's section 8(a)(2) critics have ignored
the broader purposes and functions of the pre-Wagner Act
schemes. The employee-representation plan movement was not
simply generated as a strategy to avert unions, nor did it attempt to
accomplish its goals only by presenting the illusion of collective
bargaining.
The employee-representation plan movement represents one of
several strategies tried by American employers in the first third of
this century to better achieve what always has been the primary
labor relations goal of managers with responsibilities to maximize
returns for the providers of capital - the extraction of the maxi
mum production out of labor input relative to the cost of that input.
Managerial efforts toward this goal confront the special problem of
human control - a problem that of course does not burden efforts
to maximize returns from the capital input of production. Workers
of course resist control not simply to retain the satisfaction of inde-

68. See, e.g., DoNALD M. WELLS, EMPTY PROMISES, QUALITY OF WORKING LIFE PRO·
GRAMS AND THE LABOR MOVEMENT 126 (1987); David Brody, Section 8(a) (2) and the Ori
gins of the Wagner Act, in REsroRING THE PROMISE, supra note 6, at 34.
69. In retrospect, labor historian Irving Bernstein concluded that employee
representation plans were "the most important device employers used to prevent or under
mine labor organization" before the post-Act organization victories of the late 1930s. IRVING
BERNSTEIN, THE LEAN YEARS 156 (1972).
70. Senator Wagner, for instance, viewed employer-dominated employee-representation
plans as "the greatest obstacles to collective bargaining." He argued that "the abolition of
the employer-dominated union" had to be "the very first step toward genuine collective bar
gaining." 78 CONG. REc. 3443 (1934).
71. Pub. L. No. 73-67, §§ 7(a)(1), 15, 40, 48 Stat. 195 (1933). Senator Wagner cited a 1933
study finding that the number of employees covered by employer-dominated employee
representation plans increased "from 432,000 in 1932 to 1,164,000 in 1933, representing a gain
of 169 percent. More than 69 percent of the company-union schemes . . . [were] inaugurated
in the brief period [after] the passage of the Recovery Act." 78 CoNG. REc. 4230 (1934).
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pendence, but more importantly to moderate the pace and intensity
of their work.72
Early entrepreneurial capitalists were able to maintain tight
control of their workforces in small firms through a combination of
both unlimited discretionary power to discipline, fire, and promote,
and also the development of employee loyalty through personal in
teractions.73 As firms increased in size, as owners became much
more removed from contacts with workers, as layers of manage
ment were added to firm hierarchies, and as more integrated pro
duction required greater coordination between workers, employers
became more dependent on the "stick" of uncontrolled supervisory
authority. The authority of foremen to coerce workers through the
docking of pay, suspension, discharge, physical abuse, eviction from
company housing, and even blacklisting for employment elsewhere
in the industry, was of course usually effective in the short

run.

However, the harsh and negative nature of this authority provoked
equally negative reactions from workers, increasingly concentrated
in large numbers in huge plants. The labor violence and militancy
of the early twentieth century was the result.74
Employers responded by softer methods of labor control, at
tempting to direct employees' loyalty toward the firm rather than
toward their peers. One strategy, which generally was not success
ful in avoiding labor strife and did not survive the depression in
most firms,75 was to induce workers to accept authoritarian control
by the provision of welfare benefits, such as insurance for work
caused injuries, pensions, and stock purchase opportunities.76 An
other related strategy was the employee-representation plan move72.
If there is

one undisputed finding of industrial sociology, it is this: In every known soci
ety in which the division of labor is not fixed by custom, workers doing related tasks
attempt to gain control over their workplace. This struggle for autonomy concerns every
aspect of productive activity: the way tools and machines are used, and by whom; the
determination of wages and income; patterns of recruitment and promotion; standards
of satisfactory performance and penalties for failing to meet them; and so on.
PmRE & SABEL, supra note 63, at 111.
73. See RICHARD EDWARDS, CONTESTED TERRAIN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
WORKPLACE IN THE TwENTIE1H CENTURY 23-27 (1979).
74. See id. at 53-57.
75. As Sanford Jacoby has stressed in his writings, however, welfare capitalism has had a
continuous existence in some firms. See SANFORD JACOBY, MODERN MANORS (1997).
76. See LIZABE1H COHEN, MAKING A NEW DEAL: INDUSTRIAL WORKERS IN CHICAGO,
1919-1939, at 179-89 (1989); EDWARDS, supra note 73, at 91-97. Most of the benefit plans
could be and often were discontinued as abruptly as they were introduced. They were also
frequently used to discipline disloyal employees as well as to reward loyal service. See
ROBERT OZANNE, A CENTURY OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AT McCoRMicK AND
INTERNATIONAL HARVESTER 71-95 (1967).
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ment. In the view of one contemporary expert proponent' of the
movement, "employee representation was the main weapon of the
welfare arsenal in the businessman's thrust toward [his] goal" of
"smooth labor waters, untroubled by strikes and agitation which
threatened the power and authority of the employer. "77 Although
by the time of World War I the catalyst for adoption of an em
ployee-representation plan was most often a desire to avert an in
dependent union,78 the plans were more broadly designed to
achieve enhanced managerial control over unrepresented workers.
lliustrative is the Works Council system established by Interna
tional Harvester in 1918. At each of its plants Harvester used the
Works Councils, whose membership, agenda, and decisions were
dependent on management approval,79 to have certain privileged
workers govern other workers in the interest of the company. For
instance, after unsuccessful strikes in 1919, the Councils were given
the responsibility of determining which strikers to rehire.Bo
Through domination of the agenda and resources of the Councils,
management was later able to use them to help resist cost-of-living
increases in wages during an inflation and recommend wage cuts
during a recession.Bl
A more general study of industrial Chicago during this pre
Wagner Act period found that employers used employee-represen
tation plans not only to resist unions, but more broadly to "legiti
mate firing strikers, reducing wages, and enacting unpopular
policies."82 This study also found that employee representation
plans of this period had the ancillary benefit of enabling senior
company management to exert more ·direct control over the
workforce and thereby reduce the agency costs of having foremen
use their discretionary power for their own personal and often
77. William M. Leiserson, Contributions of Personnel Management to Improved Labor
Relations, in WERTHEIM LECTURES ON lNousTRIAL RELATIONS 1928, at 148, 154 (Otto S.
Beyer et al. eds., 1929). Andrew Carnegie agreed that some form of employee representa
tion was necessary to maintain managerial control in the modern hierarchical firm. See
ANDREW CARNEGIE, THE GosPEL OF WEALTH AND OTHER TIMELY EssAYS 103-04 (1933).
78. The first pre-war employee-representation schemes, such as the one instituted at
Ftlenes in the first years of the century, seem not to have been at all concerned with unions,
however. See Daniel Nelson, The Company Union Movement, 1900-1937: A Reexamination,
56 Bus. HIST. REv. 335, 339-40 (1982).
79. See 1 Toni Gilpin, Left by Themselves: A History of the United Farm Equipment and
Metal Workers Union 1938-1955, at 44-50 (1992) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale Uni
versity) (on file with author).
80. See id. at 51-54.
81. See EDWARDS, supra note 73, at 107-08; Gilpin, supra note 79, at 58, 61-62.
82. CoHEN, supra note 76, at 172.
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prejudiced ends.s3 By making foremen subject to review by
management-controlled, employee committees, the front-line su
pervisors could be forced to be "more careful and liberal in their
actions and decisions as they come in contact with the workmen
from day to day."84
Furthermore, the typical functioning of employee
representation plans of this period indicates that they were
designed not simply to avert unionization through creating an illu
sion of collective bargaining for workers, but rather to create an
unfertile environment for any robust collective worker resistance to
company directives. The principal function of most employee
representation plans was to provide some formal mechanism for the
consideration of individual employee grievances, usually based on
allegations of a foreman's failure to treat an employee fairly under
work rules set by higher management.ss For instance, a plan might
establish a joint employee-management shop committee to consider
individual grievances initially, as well as a plant-wide joint commit
tee to eventually consider appeals.s6
At least before the NIRA's mandate of collective bargaining,s7
these representation plans did not, however, generally provide any
avenue for pressing collective interests, such as some form of
pseudo-bargaining over wages or work rules. The plans also did not
make provisions for employee representatives to meet with their
constituents or with their peers in other committees or in parallel
structures in other plants.ss The purpose clearly was to identify the
83. See id. at 172-73. One historian's analysis of the extant records of the pre-Wagner Act
Industrial Assembly of the Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company and the Cooperative Associa
tion of the Leeds & Northrup company reached a similar conclusion: "Their work extended
the managerial hierarchy to the shop floor, enlarging the realm of the personnel officials,
curtailing the prerogatives of the line supervisors and enlisting lower echelon employees in
the operation of the firm." Nelson, supra note 78, at 352.
84.
173.

SWIFr & COMPANY,

YEARBOOK OF 1923,

at

46, quoted in COHEN, supra

note 76, at

85. See, e.g., EDWARDS, supra note 73, at 105-07 (principal discussion of General Electric
Lynn works); COHEN, supra note 76, at 173 (noting WISconsin Steel and Swift & Co.

plan at
plans).

86. See EDWARDS, supra

note

73,

at

105-07.

87.

For a description of the impact of the NIRA on employee-representation plans, prin
cipally in the steel industry, see RAYMOND L. HoGLER & GUILLERMO J. GRENIER,
EMPLOYEE PARTICIPATION AND LABOR LAW IN THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE 40-47 (1992).
Neither this account nor others indicate that plans were greatly engaged in collective bargain
ing on general issues rather than in the consideration of individual grievances, although
Hogler and Grenier report that employee representatives at Weirton Steel at one point de
manded and received a 10% pay increase. See id. at 46.

88. See EDWARDS, supra

note

73,

at

107.
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discontent of groups of workers and then to isolate and channel this
discontent away from collective action. 89
Beyond grievance processing, the works councils of this period
also were used by management to focus workers' attention on the
need to reduce wasteful production processes90 and employee turn
over.91 When general wage and working conditions were addressed
by the councils, as in the Harvester example, it was to serve the
objectives of management. The general announced purpose of the
employee-representation plans was to increase industrial efficiency
by ensuring labor's identification with the goals of management.92
John Leitch, an influential business consultant of the day, for in
stance, sold employee-participation schemes as a way to reduce
production costs and increase profits.93 Lowering labor costs
through increased cooperation was also the stated goal of the semi
nal representation plan devised for the Colorado Fuel and Iron
Company by Canadian industrial relations expert W.L. Mackenzie
King upon the direction of its owner, John D.Rockefeller, Jr., after
the famous Ludlow Massacre of militant workers and their families
exposed the limits of coercive control.94
Rockefeller also funded Industrial Relations Counselors, the
primary business research and consulting operation propounding
employee-representation plans in the pre-Wagner Act era. This op
eration was headed by Arthur H. Young, a leading opponent of the
enactment of section 8(a)(2) by the Wagner Congress and the oper
ator of the Harvester plan in the early 1920s. Young viewed his
mission as promoting the cooperation of capital and labor.
Confidence and good will are the foundations of every successful en
terprise, and these can be created only by securing a point of contact
between employer and employee. They must seek to understand each
other's problems, understand each other's opinions, and maintain that
unity of purpose and effort upon which the very existence of the com-

89. See COHEN, supra note 76, at 173.
90. See Nelson, supra note 78, at 346.
91. See STEVEN FRASER, LABOR WILL RuLE: SmNEY HILLMAN AND THE RISE OF AMER·
ICAN LABOR 123-28 (1991). High turnover had become a special concern of large industrial
manufacturers in the 1920s, and was generally one of the targets of the welfare capitalism and
associated employee-representation plan movement of this period. See COHEN, supra note
76, at 174-75; Nelson, supra note 78, at 342.
92. One industrialist (Henry S. Dennison of Dennison Manufacturing) wrote that the
purpose of these plans was "to put across to the employees the idea that the company - its
success, its policies and its reputation - belongs as much to them as it does to the manage
ment." Nelson, supra note 78, at 346.
93. See HoGLER & GRENIER, supra note 87, at 17.
94. See generally HowARD M. GITELMAN, LEGACY OF THE LUDLOW MAssACRE: A
CHAPTER IN AMERICAN LABOR RELATIONS (1988).
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munity which they constitute and the whole future of democratic civi
lization depend.95

Young's boss at Harvester, Cyrus W. McCormick, shared the same
vision. McCormick, like Rockefeller, and like today's business pro
ponents of employee-involvement programs, considered his own in
dustrial relations policies much more enlightened than those of his
predecessors: "the difference [was as] between a feudalistic state
. . . and a democracy. . . . If people have a voice in the making of the
regulations which affect them, they are more able to understand
and accept law."96
Thus, for Rockefeller and McCormick as industrial entrepre
neurs, as for Young and Leitch as business consultants, the ultimate
goal of employee-representation plans was to achieve labor cooper
ation in the achievement of the primary goal of the firm, the max
imization of the firm's returns for its controlling owners. The
employee-representation movement was a strategy to control labor
toward that end without direct coercion. As one leading labor his
torian of the period concluded, "[f]or an ambitious minority of . . .
firms the installation of a company union was the final step in the
process of organizing and controlling the labor force."97
Not surprisingly, the opponents of section 8(a)(2) attacked the
provision before the Wagner Congress not only by contending that
workers should have the option of employer-initiated unions, but
also by extolling what they perceived as the virtues of employee
representation plans. The opponents' testimony repeatedly as
serted that such plans should be valued because they can enhance
labor cooperation and productivity, while also satisfying the needs
of workers to participate in decisionmaking about their work
place.98 The passage of the Wagner Act thus represents a rejection,
at least for that day, of rationales for managerial involvement in
employee-representation schemes that are the direct antecedents of
today's arguments against section 8(a)(2).99
In order to understand fully the connection between pre
Wagner Act employee-representation plans and modern employee
involvement programs, however, the contemporary section 8(a)(2)
·

95. Brody, supra note 68, at 35.
96. James R. Mcintyre, The History of Wisconsin Steel Works of the International Har
vester Company 40 (typescript, available at Southeast Chicago Historical Project Archives),
quoted in CoHEN, supra note 76, at 171-72.
97. Nelson, supra note 78, at 343.
98. 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF NLRA, 1935, at 911-920, 949-62, 435-38, 1057.
99. This is the thesis of Professor Kohler's forceful essay, Models of Worker Participation:
The Uncertain Significance of Section 8(a)(2), supra note 56.
·
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critics' distortion of the present as well as the past must be clarified.
For the critics have attempted to sever the historical connection not
only by ignoring the broader purposes of the pre-Act schemes, but
also by ignoring the anti-union purposes and effects of the more
modern programs.
The effect of modern employee-involvement programs on union
organizing has been well documented. One study of union certifi
cation elections in the early eighties found that unions won only
three of nineteen elections in bargaining units that included
management-employee advisory or discussion committees, com
monly called Quality of Work Life Programs at the time. The study
concluded that " [q]uality of work life programs efficiently thwarted
unionization."100 Other studies published later in the 1980s also
found that a variety of employee-involvement programs substan
tially reduced the chances of union organization.101 Indeed, in their
influential The Transformation of American Industrial Relations,
Professors Thomas A. Kochan, Harry C. Katz, and Robert B.
McKersie conclude that when employers adopted employee
participation schemes along with other employee benefits, such as
incentive pay for skill development and flexible hours, as part of a
new management model, "they were essentially immune to unioni
zation in the 1970s."102 In a later study of 165 Board-conducted
representation elections in the 1990s, Professor James Rundle
found that unions confronted employee-involvement programs in
thirty-two percent of organizing campaigns, that unions were more
than fifty percent more likely to be successful in the absence of such
programs and that employers with programs "ran more aggressive
antiunion compaigns. "103
100. See AFL-CIO, AFL-CIO Organizing Survey 6 {Feb. 1984) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with author); see also Kate Bronfenbrenner & Tom Juravich, The Impact of Employer
Opposition on Union Certification Wm Rates 13 tbl.5, 14 {Econ. Policy Inst. Working Paper
No. 113, 1995). Most union organizing directors affirm that modem employee-involvement
programs have made organizing more difficult. See Bargaining Stressed as Basis of Worker
Participation Plans, AFL-CIO NEws, Nov. 20, 1982, at 3.
101. See John Evansohn, The Effects of Mechanisms of Managerial Control on Unioniza·
tion, 28 INous. REL. 91 (1989); Jack Fiorito et al., The Impact ofHuman Resource Policies on
Union Organizing, 26 INous. REL. 113 (1987); Thomas A. Kochan et al., The Effects of
Corporate Strategy and Workplace Innovations on Union Representation, 39 INDUS. & LAB.
REL. REv. 487 (1986).
102. KocHAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 64.
103. See James Rundle, Winning Hearts and Minds in the Era of Employee Involvement
Programs, in ORGANIZING TO WIN: NEw REsEARCH ON UNION STRATEGIES 213, 218, 219
tbl.13.1, 220 (Kate Bronfenbrenner et al. eds., 1998) (unions won 30% of elections when
confronted with employee-involvement programs, and 48% when such programs did not ex
ist); see also Bronfenbrenner & Juravich, supra note 100.
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This evidence does not of course indicate that any particular
employee-involvement program or even most such programs have
been motivated primarily by a desire to avoid unionization. Analy
sis of the intellectual origins and of the design and operation of such
programs, however, certainly indicates that impeding unionization
is at least often part of their general objective.
The intellectual theory of modem employee-involvement pro
grams can be traced back to the beginning of the human relations
school of personnel management in the decade before passage of
the Wagner Act. The famous experiments of Professor Elton Mayo
at the Hawthorne plant of the Western Electric Company in
Chicago convinced the researchers and other social scientists that
management could use insights from the new disciplines of psychol
ogy and sociology to control the culture of the workplace to direct
workers' attitudes and values toward cooperation rather than con
tention with management's goals.104

The human relations ap

proach, like the employee-representation plan movement of the
1920s, first focused on isolating the grievances of individual work
ers;105 but the human relations experts soon shifted their attention
to the social psychology of small group behavior and started coun
seling employers to channel rather than suppress the normal human
need for group action. Employers were advised that productivity
could be increased not only through convincing individual workers
that their voice was heard by management, but also by marshalling
such social psychological forces as group identification and peer
group pressure for the firm.106
The theories of 'the human relations experts were utilized by
some firms, beginning in the 1950s and 1960s, and by many more in
the 1970s, to develop a human resources model of personnel man
agement as an alternative to the industrial relations model of collec
tive bargaining.107

The behavioral science training of human

resource specialists did not consider how collective bargaining
could be made effective for a firm. Organizational behavior theory
posited a unitary view of the firm in which unions representing sep
arate employee interests had no legitimate role and existed only
because management had not competently developed the appropri104. See WELLS, supra note
AND MORALE (1947).

68, at 126-27; see also FJ. RoETHLISBERGER, MANAGEMENT

105. See COHEN, supra note 76, at 173-74.
106. See id. at 171-72.
107. See EILEEN APPELBAUM & ROSEMARY BATI,
18-21 (1994); KOCHAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 62-65.
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ate culture.108 Thus, like the original human relations theories, the
organizational behavior theory underlying the human resource
model was concerned with the development of employee commit
ment to firm goals through individual and group participation
programs.109
This period of course also witnessed the increasingly rapid de
cline of union density in the United States. 110 This decline has been
associated with increased employer resistance to unions.111 The
resistance has been shown to have taken the form both of aug
mented legal and illegal coercive tactics during union organizational
campaigns,112 and perhaps more importantly, of massive relocation
of work to new nonunion sites.113 However, the proliferation of the
human resource model of personnel management in both old and
new nonunion work sites during this period and the lack of union
organizing success where it was adopted as noted above, strongly
suggest that it was in part embraced as another barrier against col
lective bargaining.114
It is not difficult to understand how management-controlled em
ployee advisory committees, discussion groups, or "quality circles,"
as they were often called in the 1970s,us can be used as a tool of the
108. See APPELBAUM & BAIT, supra note 107, at 19-20.
109. See KoCHAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 62.
110. In the mid-1950s union membership as a percentage of the nonagricultural
workforce peaked at around 34%. See FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 4, at 221. This
percentage had declined to about 19% by the mid-1980s. See Larry T. Adams, Changing
Employment Patterns of Organized Workers, MoNTIILY LAB. REv., Feb. 1985, at 25, 26 &
tbl.1; Weiler, Promises to Keep, supra note 4, at 1771. The decline has continued to below
11 %, less than the aggregate union density at the time of the passage of the Wagner Act. See
supra note 5.
111. See, e. g., Weiler, Promises to Keep, supra note 4, at 1773-74.
112. See FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 4, at 233-39.
113. See KoCHAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 66-76.
114. This is certainly the view of Kochan, Katz, and McKersie. They describe employee
participation as the "cornerstone" of the human resource management policy and union
avoidance strategy of the typical nonunion firm in the 1970s. See KoCHAN ET AL., supra note
5, at 56-57.
115. The designation "quality circle," like other management terms - such as "quality of
work life" program - in vogue in this period, can of course be applied to any structure that
management chooses. However, quality circles have almost always included only small num
bers of employees from the same work unit functioning as an off-line advisory group that
functions parallel to, rather than as part of, the production process. Quality circles have been
set up to identify and address quality and productivity problems, and often also end up treat
ing other issues of concern to employee participants. They have been nominally voluntary in
nature, though attendance at meetings is usually compensated at the worker's regular hourly
rate and participation can also be encouraged by supervisors' favoritism. Only limited train
ing, in nonproduction skills such as communication and group problem solving, is offered
participants. See APPELBAUM & BAIT, supra note 107, at 76. See generally David I. Levine
& Laura D'Andrea Tyson, Participation, Productivity, and the Firm's Environment, in PAY
ING FOR PRODUCTIVITY: A LooK AT THE EVIDENCE 183 {Alan s. Blinder ed., 1990).
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human resource behavioral scientists to create a ·workplace culture
that is unfriendly to union organization.116 Management can assign
employees to groups with an eye toward isolating prounion employ
ees from potential converts. The isolation of potential dissidents
can be furthered if control of the committee rests in a group leader
or facilitator who moves the discussion toward criticism of the views
of the identified pariah.117 The group leader or facilitator can en
courage employees to identify these views as destructive of the co
operation necessary for the successful operation of the firm and of
the job security that success can ensure. Management also can use
a committee to shape the values and perceptions of employees by
controlling the information made available to the committee and by
keeping direct, though often subtle, control of its agenda.118 Orga
nizational behavior theory holds that individuals, perhaps to avoid
what psychologists call cognitive dissonance, can be moved to be
come psychologically committed to organizational goals not dic
tated by their self-interest when the costs of rejecting the goals are
high and alternative goals are not readily available. Thus, interac
tion in an employee group can confirm commitment to firm goals
when dissent is penalized and alternative goals stifled.119
Examples of how employers have used "quality circles" to avert
unions can be found in one of the few in depth studies of the use of
a "quality circle" program as part of an alternative human resources
system of personnel management.12° The researcher began his
study of a nonunion suture manufacturing plant expecting to show
how the plant's use of quality circles increased productivity by re
ducing worker alienation and job dissatisfaction.121 In the midst of
his study, however, the researcher realized that the circles were
designed and operated to maintain management control and to
avert unionization. The goal, to use the words of �he social psychol
ogist responsible for the system, is to have "puppet[s] without
116. See Gerald R. Salancik & Jeffrey Pfeffer, A Social Information Processing Approach
to Job Attitudes and Task Design, 23 AoMIN. Ser. Q. 224, 247-48 (1978).
117. See GUILLERMO J. GRENIER, lNHuMAN RELATIONS: QUALITY CmcLES AND ANTI
UNIONISM IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY 68, 75-76, 92 (1988).
118. See id. at 17-18.
119. See JoHN J. LAWLER, UNIONIZATION AND DEUNIONIZATION: STRA'IEGY, TACTICS,
AND OUTCOMES 122-23 (1990); Jeffrey Pfeffer & John Lawler, Effects of Job Alternatives,
Extrinsic Rewards, and Behavioral Commitment on Attitude Toward the Organization: A
Field Test of the Insufficient Justification Paradigm, 25 AoMIN. Ser. Q. 38, 43-44 (1980);
Gerald R. Salancik, Commitment and the Control of Organizational Behavior and Belief, in
NEW DIRECTIONS IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 1, 16 (Barry M. Staw & Gerald R.
Salancik eds., 1977).
120. See GRENIER, supra note 117.
121. See id. at xvi.
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strings . . . . I plant the seed in you to make you think the idea of
doing what I want you to do was yours. " 122
The means are the techniques noted above. Meeting agendas
are controlled by facilitators and leaders based on directions from
upper-level management; although the facilitators present them
selves as having open minds, the intended results of meetings are
predetermined.123 Dissenting workers are isolated and criticized in
the management-controlled circle meetings.124

Peer pressure is

marshaled to direct employees toward firm goals; rewards and pun
ishments depend on peer evaluations that are based not only on
production criteria, but also on such considerations as "maintains
positive attitude towards self and others, " "commitment to com
pany philosophy, "125 and "mutual commitment to achieve our
goal[ ] of productivity. " 126 The teams are used to generate conflicts
between workers, s0, that they blame each other rather than man
agement for problenis.127 The desired result is employees' commit
ment to their work situation based on appreciation of their
"inability to change it. " 12s
The critics of section 8(a) (2) would claim that this description of
the use of quality circles is not representative. The critics highlight
a benign face of human resource management, one that truly does
look toward increasing productivity by actually making jobs more
satisfying and less alienating.129 It is impossible to determine defin
itively whether this face presents an illusion, but there is no evi
dence that the quality circle movement of the 1970s and early 1980s
brought lasting improvements in employee productivity and job sat
isfaction.

Some employers of course claimed such success, and

studies since Elton Mayo's pre-Wagner Act experiments at the
Hawthorne plant have shown that an increase in the attention paid
to workers, almost regardless of the form it takes, can lead to tem
porary improvements in labor morale and productivity.13o How
ever, objective empirical research has failed to establish a
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at 125.
See id. at 49.
See id. at 77-78, 83, 92-93.
Id. at 47.
Id. at 48; see also id. at 83.
See id. at 91.
Id. at xviii.
See supra text accompanying notes 62-67.
See KoCHAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 87. One study found that "(s]ome consultants

and managers . . . simply advocated change for change's sake" based on a desire to a<;hieve
what has been called a "Hawthorne effect." See APPELBAUM & BArr, supra note 107, at 74.
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significant relationship between such programs and job satisfaction
or productivity.131 In 1990, employee-involvement advocates David
Levine and Laura Tyson concluded that the half-life of consultative
quality circles is under three years and that "quality circles and
other purely advisory shopfloor arrangements are not likely to
achieve sustainable improvements in productivity."132
As Levine and Tyson also stress, and as others have more re
cently iterated, some studies of modem employee-participation
programs do purport to show that programs that do more than only
provide channels for collective employee advice can enhance pro
ductivity.133 However, some of these studies may treat employee
participation schemes in countries with very different industrial re
lations systems.134 Many of the studies of American firms must be
qualified by serious methodological limitations.135

One more

tightly controlled study that attempted to transcend these limita
tions found that, at least in nonunion workplaces, employee
management committees were to a significant extent negatively as
sociated with efficiency, as measured by production time per unit of
output.136
131. Tue literature is reviewed in Thomas R. Bailey, Discretionary Effort and the Organi
zation of Work: Employee Participation and Work Reform since Hawthorne, 21-25 (Jan.
1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). See, e. g., THOMAS KocHAN ET AL.,
WORKER PARTICIPATION AND AMERICAN UNIONS: THREAT OR OPPORTUNITY? 63-64
(1984); Edward E. Lawler III & Susan A. Mohrman, Quality Circles: After the Honeymoon,
ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS, Spring 1987, at 42-43. See also APPELBAUM & BATT, supra
note 107, at 20, 70.
132. Levine & Tyson,

supra note 115, at 197.
See id. at 197-201.
134. See, e. g., John R. Cable & Felix R. FitzRoy, Productive Efficiency, Incentives and
Employee Participation: Some Preliminary Results for West Germany, 33 KYKLos 100 (1980);
John F. Krafcik, Triumph of the Lean Production System, SLOAN MGMT. REv., Fall 1988, at
133.

41-52.
135. Tue domestic studies often rely on the perceptions of managers, and perhaps em
ployees, rather than directly testing the effects of participation on the behavior of managers
and employees. Most studies also fail to make comparisons with a control group of firms or
plants without employee involvement. Almost none take into account the effect of unioniza
tion. Some may incorporate bias. See Maryellen R. Kelley & Bennett Harrison, Unions,
Technology, and Labor-Management Cooperation, in UNIONS AND ECONOMIC COMPETITIVE
NESS 247, 249, 258-59 (Lawrence Mishel & Paula B. Voos eds., 1992).
136. In this study Maryellen Kelley and Bennett Harrison examined a representative
sample of all manufacturing activity in the United States using machine tools (one-fourth of
total manufacturing). Tuey found no evidence that the presence of an employee-involvement
program lowered machining production time per unit of output. Tuey also found that the
presence of such a program in the absence of a union did not increase employment security
as measured by the outsourcing of work, or job enrichment as measured by whether blue
collar workers were allowed to program their own tools. See Kelley & Harrison, supra note
135, at 250-51.
Kelley and Harrison's conclusion that employee-involvement programs are more likely to
enhance productivity and worker participation in the presence of unions is supported by
other research. See William N. Cooke, Employee Participation Programs, Group-Based
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The most important flaw in the section 8(a) (2) critics' depiction
of contemporary employee-involvement programs, however, is not
reflected in the contrast of the uncertain impact of employee
involvement schemes on productivity with their clearer impact on
union organizing. It admittedly does not seem likely that the great
proliferation of such programs since 1980137 can be explained by a
further increase in American management's resistance to unions.
While the 9ontinuing decline in union density during this period
suggests that unions have not posed an increasing threat, during the
same period American firms have been confronted with increasing
international competition and consequent pressures to adopt new
production techniques to enhance returns on capital.
The most important flaw in the critics' story is instead that the
primary new production model, the Japanese system of "lean pro
duction, " has been embraced by employers of American workers to
increase profits not through enhanced employee morale and job
satisfaction, but rather, in the tradition of the pre-Wagner Act
employee-representation schemes and the human resource theory
of management, through gaining more effective control of and
more intense efforts from workers.138

Since the desire to use

management-controlled employee groups to facilitate the imple
mentation of new techniques of lean production, more than the de
sire to thwart unions, may provide the primary impetus for
management's contemporary campaign against section 8(a)(2), it is
important to examine both the myths and the realities of the Japa
nese system of production that has been imported into the United
States.

Incentives, and Company Performance: A Union-Nonunion Comparison, 47 INDUS. & LAB.
REL. REv. 594, 606 (1994); Adrienne E. Eaton & Paula B. Voos, Unions and Contemporary
Innovations in Work Organization, Compensation, and Employee Participation, in UNIONS
AND ECONOMIC COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 135, at 173, 174-75.
137. One survey concluded that more than 9 of 10 employee involvement programs ex
tant in 1986 were established after 1980. William N. Cooke, Factors Influencing the Effect of
Joint Union-Management Programs on Employee-Supervisor Relations, 43 INDUS. & LAn.
REL. REv. 587, 591 (1990). The proliferation has apparently continued into the 1990s. See
EDWARD LAWLER ET AL., EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT AND TOTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT:
PRACTICES AND REsULTS IN FORTUNE 1000 COMPANIES 115-18 {1992).
138. For instance, one study of 53 auto plants in the 1980s found that the actual use of
production teams had no positive impact on labor productivity or product quality, but that
associated greater management discretion over work pace, allocation of overtime, layoffs,
and transfers did increase productivity. See Harry C. Katz et al., Industrial Relations and
Productivity in the U.S. Automobile Industry, 3 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 685,
705, 708 (1988).

C.
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In the 1980s American management experts and consultants be
gan a major effort to convince American corporations that meeting
the expanding international challenge required a transformation of
the system of mass production that had earlier served American
manufacturing predominance. Not surprisingly, the primary model
for an alternative system was drawn from the nation at that time
posing the most significant challenge to the American economy One particularly influential and widely read book (The
Machine That Changed the World), reporting on an international

Japan.

study of the automotive industry at the end of the 1980s, concluded
that the diffusion of the Japanese system, which it dubbed "lean
production," was "one of the most important issues facing the
world economy in the 1990s."139
At the same time the book stressed that the diffusion had al
ready made a very significant beginning, including in the United
States at such sites as New United Motor Manufacturing Inc.
(NUMMI), the General Motors!Toyota joint venture in Fremont,
California.14o The diffusion has continued: lean production, or To
tal Quality Management as it is often called, has spread to what
may now be a majority of major American manufacturing corpora
tions.141 This diffusion has been encouraged by Congress since 1988
through funding of an award, the Malcolm Baldrige National Qual
ity Award, for fulfillment of process criteria based on the Japanese
production system.142 There have been several hundred applicants
for the award and thousands of other companies have been influ
enced by lectures and conferences by managers of winning firms.143
Exactly what is the Japanese lean production system and its rel
evance for employee-involvement programs?

Advocates of the

Japanese system claim that it constitutes a rejection of the Taylorist
separation of intellectual and manual work, that it is designed to
call on the creative and intellectual contributions of front line pro139. WOMACK ET

AL.,

supra note 66,

at 69.

140.

See id.

at 82-88, 240-45.
,
141. "In the last decade U.S. industry at all levels and in all sectors has embraced some
form of Total Quality Management," the more formal name for the Japanese lean production
system. H.K. Klein & Philip Kraft, Social Control and Social Contract in NetWORKing:
Total Quality Management and the Control of Work in the United States 6 (1994) (unpub
lished manuscript, on file with author); see also Sandy Fife, The Total Quality Muddle, REP.
ON Bus. MAG., Nov. 1992, at 67 [hereinafter The Total Quality Muddle] (one third of 500
U.S. corporations report positive results).
142.

See 15 U.S.C. § 3711a (1994).
See APPELBAUM & BArr, supra note

143.

107, at 129.
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duction workers by asking them to take more responsibility and
continually to develop ideas to make their part of the production
process more efficient.144 It is said that the greater intellectual in
volvement of all workers in production, along with guarantees of
lifetime job security, produces more motivated workers who wish to
cooperate in achieving managerial goals and thus boost productiv
ity. These general descriptions apparently have convinced at least
some employee-involvement advocates that the imported Japanese
system in plants like NUMMI, including the use of quality circles
attempting to solve production problems, represents a successful
participatory system.145
Those who have more closely studied production in Japan and in
Japanese-controlled plants in North America and Europe, paint a
very different picture. First, they note that Japanese management
does not reject Taylorism. Scientific management made a major im
pact on Japanese manufacturing when first promulgated and the job
of industrial engineer that it spawned continues to be even more
important there than here.146 Indeed, one of the reasons for the
techniques of lean production is to solve the production problem
with which Taylor was primarily concerned - employee "soldier
ing,"147 or what contemporary economists might call employee
"slack": workers producing at less than their maximum rate.148 To
understand how lean production helps solve this problem, Taylor
ism must be more precisely described.
Taylor did not invent mass production or the standardization or
specialization of tasks. Taylor developed a "scientific" theory for
how management could best control workers engaged in standard
ized work. Taylor thought that in order for management to gain
maximum production from its labor force and to direct work tasks
144. See WOMACK ET AL., supra note 66, at 13-14, 100-02. Former Secretary of Labor
Ray Marshall, a member of the Dunlop Commission on the Future of the American Work
Place, apparently told a management conference that the NUMMI plant had "done away
with Taylorism." Mike Parker & Jane Slaughter, Management by Stress: Behind the Scenes at
Nummi Motors, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1988, at F2.
145. See Paul S. Adler, The 'Leaming Bureaucracy': New United Motor Manufacturing,
Inc., 15 REsEARCH IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 111 (1992); Levine & 'fyson, supra note
115, at 205.
146. See RICHARD J. SCHONBERGER, JAPANESE MANuFACTURING TECHNIQUES 192-93
(1982). Schonberger is an advocate of Japanese production techniques for American manag
ers. He is "astounded" by claims that the Japanese reject Taylorism "in favor of a more
humanistic approach." He explains that the "Japanese out-Taylor us all - including putting
Taylor to good use in QC circles or small group improvement activities." Id. at 193.

147. The word "soldiering" is derived from the practice of exempting soldiers transported
by the navy from having to perform the chores of the naval crew. See KANIGEL, supra note
62, at 163.
148. See

EowARDs, supra note

73,

at 97.
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precisely, it would have to secure from workers their knowledge of
how the work could be most quickly completed.149 Taylor proposed
that industrial engineers time and record the movements of the
most skillful workers and then specify how each elemental part of a
job should be performed. Specialized foremen could then conduct
comprehensive performance evaluations and a piece-rate system
could provide incentives to meet the pace of the best workers, the
"first class men," rather than that of the least efficient.150
The scientific management techniques proposed by Taylor, how
ever, were never fully successful.151 Workers understand that their
limited control of the pace and substance of their work depends on
their having more knowledge about the work than their supervisors.
Superior knowledge allows them to reduce the intensity of work
when they are tired or distracted, and to increase their pace when
necessary to meet some emergency or to aid another worker. Supe
rior knowledge allows them to vary their motions to avoid oppres
sive repetition even

if

one particular set of motions is the most

efficient. Superior knowledge also affords workers leverage against
what they may perceive as unfair managerial directives. Not only
does knowledge provide some protection against replacement dur
ing a strike,152 it also may make "working to rule" an effective alter
native to a complete work stoppage, for

if managerial rules

do not

define the most efficient process, working in accord with these rules
may significantly inconvenience management.153
149. Taylor asserted that the greatest obstacle to management's getting full "coopera
tion" from its workforce "lay in the ignorance of the management as to what really consti
tutes a proper day's work for a workman." FREDERICK WINSLOW TAYLOR, THE PRINCIPLES
OF SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT (1911), reprinted in FREDERICK WINSLOW TAYLOR, SCIENTIFIC
MANAGEMENT 53 (1947).
150. See EDWARDS, supra note 73, at 100-01; HARLEY SHAIKEN, WoRK TRANSFORMED:
AUTOMATION AND LABOR IN THE COMPUTER AGE 22-25 (1984).
151. See EDWARDS, supra note 73, at 101-04.
152. Not surprisingly, there are reports of firms attempting to use employee-involvement
programs to document job procedures for replacement workers to be employed during an
impending strike. See Mike Parker & Jane Slaughter, Should the Labor Movement Buy
TQM?, J. OF ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE MGMT., Oct. 1993, at 51.

153.

Consider this description by a researcher with experience in a machine shop:

When workers feel harassed, they often begin producing parts exactly 'according to the
print.' This 'refusal to redesign' can be even more disruptive than a strike. In a strike,
production is halted, but 'work to rule' can produce mountains of scrap. Take the case
of a machine repair shop in the auto industry . . . . When management initiated a cam
paign to strictly enforce lunch periods and wash-up time, the judgment of some machin
ists began to fade. At about this time a foreman dashed up to the shop with a 'hot' job
that was needed to keep the production machines operating. . . . Anxious to get the job
done quickly, the foreman insisted that the machinist run the lathe at a high rate of
speed and plunge the large drill through the part. Under normal circumstances the ma
chinist would have tried to talk the foreman out of this approach but now was only too
happy to oblige what were, after all, direct orders. The part not only turned out to be
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Even workers without unions therefore have resisted being
studied by engineers and foremen. Mass production workers of
course also have not been fully successful in resisting having their
jobs minutely defined and their work pace accelerated. Industrial
engineers gradually have been able to determine the best ways to
complete most assembly line tasks, for instance. But the increase in
the pace of product change demanded by more sophisticated con
sumers requires more frequent changes in production processes and
augments the problem that Taylor highlighted.
The techniques of lean production, however, have enabled the
Japanese, and their imitators throughout the world, to make Taylor
ism much more effective. These techniques advance Taylorism in
two interrelated ways: first, by enlisting lower-level workers in the
evaluation and criticism of fellow workers; and second, by eliminat
ing buffers, such as inventory stocks and extra work time and
replacements, that protect workers from production irregularities.
The result, in the words of one proponent of lean production, is
"work . . . regimented in its minutest gestures."154 The Malcolm
Baldrige Award, far from honoring employee empowerment, evalu
ates companies on the consistency and control of their processes, so
that any substitute employees would make the same product.155
The Japanese achieve this result in part by more effectively ex
tracting employees' knowledge of the production process. Their
time and motion studies are conducted either by lower-level super
visors, who can better see through the strategies of workers to hide
their shortcuts, or by training quality circles of workers to conduct
scrap, but part of the lathe turned blue from the friction generated by the high speed.
The disciplinary campaign was short-lived.
SHAIKEN, supra note 150, at 19-20.
154. Adler, supra note 145, at 113. Professor Adler based his description on work at the
NUMMI plant. Studies of other work sites using the Japanese production system have
reached similar conclusions.
For instance, a comprehensive study of CAMI, the General Motors and Suzuki joint ven·
ture in Ingersoll, Ontario, found jobs there to be
repetitive and machine paced. Job design is premised on rigidly prescribed routines and
short cycle times and conforms to an industrial engineering set of strictures: jobs must
be broken down into small units of discrete tasks; each job must have a detailed defini
tion so that it can be easily reassigned; each job must be balanced in terms of time; the
skill level required for each task must be limited so that it can be learned quickly.
DAVID ROBERTSON ET AL., CAW-CANADA REsEARCH GROUP ON CAMI, THE CAMI
REPORT. LEAN PRODUCTION IN A UNIONIZED AUTo PLANT 9 (1993) [hereinafter CAMI
REPORT]. The CAMI training manual states: "The standardized operation shows the best
methods of performing every operation in a process which any associate must strictly observe
in doing the job. . . . Improved efficiency begins with standardized operations. . . . Everyone
performs the same operation the same way." JAMES RINEHART ET AL., JuST ANOTHER CAR
FACTORY? LEAN PRODUCTION AND ITS D1scoNTENTS 28 (1997) (quoting CAMI training
manual) (internal quotation marks omitted).
155. See 15 U.S.C. § 3711a(d) (1994).
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their own studies.156 At

NUMMI, for instance,

"work teams" are

asked to improve continuously, or, in the Japanese production ver
nacular, to "kaizen" their production process by studying their
work motions and to develop suggestions to enhance quality or pro
ductivity and reduce waste.157 These suggestions cannot be imple
mented

autonomously; . they must be

negotiated with teams

upstream and downstream in the production process and in other
shifts. They also must be approved by management, for "the meth
ods in place at any given time [are] to be respected down to the
second."158 The quality circles or work team meetings are utilized
to make the workers feel that they are contributing to the definition
of their jobs, even as they assist management in determining the
standardized system that insures the employees will add value to
their product for the most seconds in every minute and the most
minutes in every hour.159
The ability of the Japanese and their American imitators to
achieve the Taylorist ideal of minute standardization of job routines
156. See Knuth Dohse et al., From "Fordism" to "Toyotism"? The Social Organization of
the Labor Process in the Japanese Automobile Industry, 14 PoL. & SoCY. 115, 128-29 {1985);
see also JosEPH J. FucINI & Suzy FuCINI, WoRKING FoR THE JAPANESE: INSIDE MAzoA's
AMERICAN AUTo PLANT 78 (1990) (describing how Mazda workers were trained and in
duced to do time studies on themselves).
157. A manager at NUMMI described employee involvement there as follows:

The first thing you do is teach workers the techniques of work analysis. Next you get the
workers as a group to time each other with a stopwatch. . . . After everybody has been
timed, workers analyze what they think is the best performance and break that process
down into little pieces. . . . The best way of doing the job is codified and people then do
the job as we've specified in the standardized work definition.
Adler, supra note 145, at 141 (quoting interview with Bill Borton, Stamping Dept. Manager,
NUMMI, in Fremont, Cal. (1987)).
158. Adler, supra note 145, at 113. A study of another much cited example of the use of
Japanese lean production in the United States - the Mazda plant at Flat Rock, Michigan discovered the same rigid job control:
Each worker in the plant is required to follow a Programmed Work Sheet (PWS) that
describes the job cycle in minute detail, including specific tasks, their sequence, and the
number of seconds allotted for each. The PWS is prominently posted near each work
station; most allow a total cycle time of one or two minutes.
Steve Babson, Lean or Mean: The MIT Model and Lean Production at Mazda, LAB. STIJD.
J., Summer 1993, at 6-7. See also FucINI & FucINI, supra note 156, at 79 ("For example, the
programmed worksheet for the one-minute-and-four-second job of applying exterior sealant
to the driver's side of a two-door car lists 14 illustrated steps . . . . [I]t had to be followed to
the letter without variation, every time a job was performed - no exceptions.").

159. See Adler, supra note 145, at 145 ("Standard IE [Industrial Engineering] times at
GM-Fremont [NUMMI's traditional predecessor plant] were set . . . [so] as to occupy the
experienced worker approximately 45 seconds out of a hypothetical cycle time of 60 seconds.
NUMMI's norm is closer to 57 seconds out of 60."); CAMI REPORT, supra note 154, at 21
(noting that CAMI work specifications are timed within centiminutes); see also FuCINI &
FucINI, supra note 156, at 37 (ascribing the productivity gains of the Japanese system to
working each worker more intensely each minute: a plant with 2000 workers which extracts
10 seconds more work out of each worker each minute gains the equivalent of 333 extra
workers).
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by utilizing worker knowledge to determine the motions of the
most efficient worker, however, is not based solely on the use of
quality circles and other tools of group psychology. The failure of
quality circles in the absence of a simultaneous redesign of the pro
duction process at many American plants illustrates that independ
ent American workers continue to be resistant to attempts to trade
their independent knowledge for some feeling of participation.
More successful American advisory work-team programs have inte
grated quality circles with the lean production process itself, includ
ing its core aspect - the elimination of the buffers that protect the
production process and workers from emergencies in the traditional
plant.
In the first place, the elimination of buffers makes quality circles
more effective because it results in workers pressuring their fellow
workers in their own circle or team and in other circles or teams to
contribute ideas, and perhaps more importantly, to accept the ideas
of others on how to accelerate work. 160 Eliminating buffers pre
vents workers from controlling the pace of their work without im
pinging upon fellow workers. For instance, the just-in-time delivery
of parts and supplies to the next stage of the production process
prevents workers from working intensely for a period to build a
cushion for a more moderate pace later. The just-in-time system
also means that the hastening of work in one area puts pressure on
work teams both upstream and downstream to figure out some way
to further accelerate their work as well. 161
The practice of providing labor power somewhat below rather
than above that calculated as necessary to meet an assembly line
speed162 means that a reduction of pace by one worker will immedi
ately affect her peers. Her absence from work will produce an even
greater burden; since there are no reserve workers allotted as
160.
The Japanese no longer accept the buffer principle. Instead of adding buffer stocks at
points of irregularity, Japanese production managers deliberately expose the work force
to the consequences. The response is that workers and foremen rally to root out the
causes of irregularity. To ignore it is to face the consequences of work stoppages .
. . . In the Toyota kanban system, for example, each time that workers succeed in
correcting the causes of recent irregularity (machine jamming, cantankerous holding de
vices, etc.), the managers remove still more buffer stock. • . . Toyota's small group im
provement activities (SGIAs) never run out of new challenges.
SCHONBERGER, supra note 146, at 32.
161. See FuCINI & FucINI, supra note 156, at 33-34; LAURIE GRAHAM, ON TiiE LINE AT
SUBARU-Isuzu 77 (1995) (describing her experience with just-in-time assembly line produc
tion, in which "team members found themselves running flat-out down the line in search of
the material handler to warn that they were dangerously low on a part").
162.

See Dohse et al., supra note

156, at 129.
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regular

team

members,

including any group

leader, must compensate with even more intense work. The elimi
nation of some extra planned time for emergencies means that the
overtime extension of an already stressful day is regularly re
quired.164 The inevitable result is significant peer pressure to work
intensely, to avoid absences and line stoppages, and to share knowl
edge to ensure maximum production.16s

In addition, the "bufferless" lean production techniques enable
managers to determine continuously where there may be addi
tional, or, with a new product, fresh slack to be squeezed from
workers. Consider, for instance, the "andon" system, under which
workers are told to pull one cord to brighten a yellow light

if they
wish the assembly line to slow or another cord for a red light if they

wish the line to stop. Red lights are seldom brightened; managers
frown on the line actually stopping,166 and, for the reasons noted in
the last paragraph, workers share this aversion. Management, how
ever, wants to see yellow lights shine. Yellow lights prove that the
system is stressed to capacity at some points.

Where it is not

stressed, lean production theory requires that workers be elimi
nated until it becomes so.167 The primary purpose and effect of the
much hailed andon system thus is not to empower workers - that
is, to give them real control of the line to enhance their morale.
Rather it is to provide information to management so that manage
ment can reduce the capacity of workers to vary from the rigors of
the detailed motions that will maximize production.16s
163. Id. at 130; see also CAMI REPORT, supra note 154, at 18.
164. See, e. g., CmuSTIAN BERGGREN, ALTERNATIVES TO LEAN PRODUCTION, WORK
ORGANIZATION IN THE SWEDISH AUTO INDUSTRY 39 (1992); RINEHART ET AL., supra note
154, at 84.
165. See BERGGREN, supra note 164, at 38-39; FuCINI & FucINI, supra note 156, at 13637; GRAHAM, supra note 161, at 131; CAMI REPORT, supra note 154, at 30; Dohse et al.,
supra note 156, at 129-33.
166. See Adler, supra note 145, at 139. Apparently at Mazda, pulling yellow cords stops
the line. Supervisors treated those who stopped the line harshly, accusing them of loafing
and at least threatening them with written reprimands. See FuCINI & FuCINI, supra note 156,
at 152; see also MIKE PARKER· & JANE SLAUGHTER, CHOOSING SIDES: UNIONS AND THE

TEAM CoNCEPT 173 (1980) (using example from General Motors' Van Nuys plant).
167. See SCHONBERGER, supra note 146, at 91 (description of trouble lights in a Kawasaki
plant in the United States under Japanese management).

168. Overtime is monitored for the same purpose. Taichi Ohno, the primary developer of
lean production at Toyota, would give his department managers only 90% of the labor, ma
chinery, and space needed to meet quotas without overtime. The managers and workers
were expected to kaizen until the department could meet its quotas without overtime. When
this occurred, Ohno would again remove 10% of the resources. See Masaaki Imai, The OH!
NO! Management System, KAlzEN CoMMUNIQUE (Kaizen Inst. of America, Camarillo, Cal.)
Wmter 1988-89, at 1, cited in Babson, supra note 158, at 8-9 (advocating use of Ohno's
technique).
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Furthermore, despite the claims of proponents of the Japanese
system that it leads to skill enhancement and thus job enrichment,
lean production represents an implementation of, rather than de
parture from, Taylor's project of transferring the control of job
skills from workers to management. It is true that the lean produc
tion system demands that workers be able to rotate into other jobs
in order to fill in for absent co-workers or to respond to frequent
rebalancing of jobs to ensure that every worker has no idle time.
The system thus may lead to a broadening of the skills of some
workers as they learn to do a number of rigidly controlled, short
cycle tasks. Skills, however, are not deepened.169 Cross-training is
typically for similar jobs within a work team.17° The new jobs may
indeed be so similar and simple that a few hours, or even minutes,
of training suffice.171 Workers are thus not given skills of general
value to the labor market. Moreover, doing a few simple, rigidly
defined, short-cycle tasks every few months is at best marginally
more stimulating than doing one such task; and being vulnerable to
sudden transfers may make work more burdensome.172 Indeed, a
worker who retains some control over the specific movements she
utilizes on one task, as well as the pace of those movements, may
find her job not only less stressful, but also somewhat more
stimulating.173
In any event, even job rotation between several controlled jobs
within a team is often more an ideal than a reality; when production
is at full pace, management wants the speed of specialization, as
well as the flexibility of limited cross-training. 174 At least in the
169. Some co=entators have described the job training in lean production systems as
"multitasking" rather than "multiskilling." See, e. g., RINEHART ET AL., supra note 154, at 4445, 51-52, 60-62.
170. See id. at 38-39; FucINI & FvcINI, supra note 156, at 39.
171. See CAMI REPORT, supra note 154, at 10. After two and one-half years of produc
tion, almost three out of every four randomly interviewed CAMI workers "said that, as a
result of training, they are no more skilled because all the jobs are about the same." Id. at 26
fig.1. See also SHIGEO SHINGO, THE TOYOTA PRODUCTION SYSTEM 132 (1981) (Toyota sys
tem requires that "the machines . . . be improved by the plant people so that even temporary
workers 'could work independently' after three days of training.").
172. See BERGGREN, supra note 164, at 30. There is some evidence that in lean produc
tion systems when management does not push for job rotation, but allows workers some
discretion in choosing movement between simple jobs, most workers prefer a steady assign
ment. See PARKER & SLAUGHTER, supra note 166, at 124 (citing reports from General Mo
tors plants in Shreveport, Louisiana, and Orion, Michigan).
173. See RINEHART ET AL., supra note 154, at 60-63, 142.
174. See Fucrn1 & FuCINI, supra note 156, at 160-61. Job rotation in fact has not been a
central part of the lean production system in Japan. See CAMI REPORT, supra note 154, at
24. It also has not always been practiced on a regular basis in lean production systems in
North America. See id. (noting that job rotation is "a unique CAMI type of thing"). Manag
ers may feel that after workers have the minimal cross-training necessary for flexibility, more
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absence of organized pressure from workers,175 job rotation in a
lean production system is limited to that level necessary to give
management flexibility to reassign workers when rebalancing and often eliminating - jobs, and to make it more difficult for any
workers to develop special "secret" knowledge about a job.176
Contrary to the naive misconceptions of some employee
involvement advocates,177 moreover, lean production systems such
as NUMMI are designed to reduce the special skills of craft work
ers.

The cross-training of skilled workers is also designed to

broaden, rather than deepen, their skills. Cross-training in the skills
of other crafts is generally at a superficial and firm-specific level.178
It is designed to reduce the number of skilled workers in the
plant179 and to make management less dependent on any particular
craft.180 Tasks requiring the most sophisticated skills are either sub
contracted181 or performed by management.182
intense production can be achieved by keeping workers in the same job as much as possible.
Furthermore, the discretion given supervisors to distribute jobs after cross-training, and in
the absence of any restrictive job classifications, provides an effective tool of favoritism to
control workers. See Babson, supra note 158, at 10. Adler, supra note 145, at 151-53, also
acknowledges favoritism as a major problem at NUMMI
175. See CAMI REPORT, supra note 154, at 25.
176. In lean production systems production workers may also be assigned certain minor
maintenance and quality testing tasks. These tasks, such as sticking a component under a
gauge, are also often routine and simple, however. See John Tomaney, The Reality of Work
place Flexibility, CAPITAL AND CLASS, Spring 1990, at 29, 48-49.
177. For instance, National Labor Relations Board Chairman William Gould, an appar
ent advocate of the NUMMI system of lean production, claims that "[t]here is a considerably
higher ratio of skilled tradesmen to production in the NUMMI plant . . . as compared to the
old General Motors Fremont facility which it replaced . . . ." WILLIAM GouLo, AGENDA
FOR REFORM 123-24 (1993). Gould offers no support for this other than an undocumented
comparison with the General Motors Saturn facility, another plant using lean production.
See id.
178. See FucINI & FucINr, supra note 156, at 93-94.
179. One analysis concluded that Mazda and NUMMI both employed fewer than one
half the number of skilled workers of many comparable, more traditional U.S. auto plants.
See PARKER & SLAUGHTER, supra note 166, at 80; see also BERGGREN, supra note 164, at 44.
180. The merging of crafts under lean production is thus an extension of the gradual loss
of craft identity in the United States described by ProRE & SABEL, supra note 63, at 122-24.
As this has happened, the basis of the craft form of shop control has been undermined.
The more the crafts consist of heterogeneous tasks, the greater the danger that
craftsmen lose their capacity to solve problems, which underpins their shop-floor power
- they no longer understand what they are doing any more than the semiskilled worker
in mass production.
Id. at 123-24. Compare the decline in craft work in the steel industry described in DAVID
MONTGOMERY, THE FALL OF THE HOUSE OF LABOR 215-16 (1987).
181. See FucINI & FucINI, supra note 156, at 94; PARKER & SLAUGHTER, supra note 166,
at 84.
182.
For example, one of the new areas of work and corresponding skill acquired by electri
cians in the past decade has been troubleshooting and programming devices called
"programmable controllers" - specialized computers which control the operation of
.
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accordance with the general purposes of pre-Wagner Act
employee-representation schemes, lean production is also designed
to reduce the numbers and layers of middle management,183 not
only to save on indirect labor costs, but also to give central manage
ment more direct control over production workers. Additional re
sponsibility may be imposed on front-line workers to supervise
their co-workers. Extra training may be given in group interaction
and problem solving for this purpose. But this extra responsibility
does not entail greater control over the organization of work.
Professors H.K. Klein and Philip Kraft, for instance, concluded
from their study of the TQM system of a plant of an unidentified
aerospace defense manufacturer that, despite the delegation of au
thority to production teams to divide production tasks and to sched
ule work to fulfill quotas, "there was little communal decision
making or emancipation from authoritarian control. Multifunction
ality meant rotation between repetitive manual tasks, scheduling of
team tasks and quality control. It did not mean design."184 As at
NUMMI, a team's practical suggestions could only be translated
into production design changes after review and approval by engi
neers and managers.185 And, in accordance with the theory of lean
production and the goals of Taylor,186 control of the production
workers was centralized more with senior managers rather than
low-level supervisors, through highly automated and computerized
production systems "used to inform managers of the activities and
the location of all workers at all times. "187
An understanding of how the Japanese production system en
ables management to exert greater control over each second of the
individual worker's work day exposes the myth that its accompany
ing employee-involvement system empowers employees collec
tively. Such an understanding belies Paul Adler's claim that the
Japanese system as practiced at NUMMI represents a "democratic"
form of Taylorism in which procedures seem "designed not primarIn

individual machines and sections of assembly lines. The technology which now allows
electronic communication between these programmable controllers and central com
puters also allows management or non-union personnel to take over from floor electri
cians the job of troubleshooting and programming.
PARKER & SLAUGHTER, supra note 166, at 82.
183. For instance, a NUMMI enthusiast reports that there "are only four supervisory
levels at NUMMI compared to six or seven at other U.S. plants." See Paul D. Staudohar,
Labor-Management Cooperation at NUMMI, 42 LAB. LJ. 57, 59 (1991).
184. Klein & Kraft, supra note 141, at 34.
185. See id.
186. See supra text accompanying note 149.
187. Klein & Kraft, supra note 141, at 34.
,
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ily as instruments . of domination, but as elements of productive
technique recognized by participants as being tools in their own col
lective interests."188 It is revealing that other studies have found
that, at least after an initial introductory period, quality circles are
increasingly used to obtain approval of production process changes
already designed by management rather than to solicit ideas from
workers.189 Adler himself acknowledges that the NUMMI work
teams have to obtain approval for any change they conceive and
that there is not only low individual autonomy, but also low work
group autonomy at NUMMI.190 Adler offers no support for his
claim that the lean production procedures, including the accompa
nying employee-involvement program, are designed, used, or per
ceived as tools for the "collective interests" of employees. The
reality at NUMMI, and at other plants using lean production,191 is
that any accompanying employee-involvement program is used to
extract the knowledge and consent of workers, rather than to en
able workers to control production in their own interests.192
188. Adler, supra note 145, at 165.
189. See, e.g., FucINI & FucINI, supra note 156, at 137-38, 151-52; CAMI REPORT, supra
154, at 34-35. Adler presents evidence for this at NUMMI as well. See Adler, supra
145, at 153.

note
note

190. See Adler, supra note 145, at 174.
191. See, e.g., CAMI REPORT, supra note 154, at 35 (describing an example of manage
ment unilaterally reversing a team's attempt to use work design authority to ease their work
day, rather than to intensify work effort).
An example from a report book kept by supervisors at CAMI reveals

that workers' participation in line rebalancing is orchestrated from the top, part of a
strategy to continuously reduce the number of workers needed to handle a given amount
of work. Workers are drawn into a pre-planned exercise, the goals ofwhich, they are led
to believe, they have had a hand in forming.

Id. at 41.

192. See Robert M. Marsh, The Difference Between Participation and Power in Japanese
Factories, 45 lNous. & LAB. REL REv. 250 (1992) (data on 48 Japanese manufacturing plants
in 1983 suggests that firms allow workers to present ideas and suggestions, but deny workers
the authority to make decisions).

At least some management advisors have recognized that lean production is in direct
tension with worker empowerment. Professor Janice Klein, for instance, acknowledged this
after observing the effects of the introduction of aspects of the Toyota production system at a
plant of a large American engine company where work teams previously had been given
some real autonomy to control work processes and participate in other managerial kinds of
decisions. See Janice A. Klein, The Human Costs of Manufacturing Reform, HARv. B. REv.,
Mar.-Apr. 1989, at 60. She notes that the just-in-time system and the rigid cycle times it
entailed reduced both the autonomy of individual workers and the autonomy of teams. See
id. at 61, 64. She concludes that management "ought not to promise workers autonomy when
they mean them to deliver an unprecedented degree of cooperation." Id. at 66. By coopera
tion, she presumably means "compliance with managerial goals." See also Janice A. Klein, A

Reexamination of Autonomy in Light ofNew Manufacturing Practices, 44 HUM. REL. 21, 25
(1991) ("The Japanese definition of employee participation focuses primarily on information

sharing as opposed to low level decision making or autonomy.").
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teams were given collective discre

tion to redesign work in order to better achieve managerial control
of the time of individual workers, the claim that lean production
enriches jobs is unconvincing. There is strong evidence that lean
production renders jobs more intense, more stressful, and less satis
fying. Workers at lean production facilities typically report that
they work not just "smarter," but also harder than at traditional
plants.193
For instance, surveys of workers at the Mazda lean production
facility in Flat Rock, Michigan found that three out of four workers
thought that they would be injured or worn out before retire
ment.194 The likelihood of being worn out before normal retire
ment age is also increased by the elimination of job classifications,
by mandatory job rotation through tightly balanced jobs, and by the
increased need for overtime caused by the elimination of buffers.19s
Workers cannot use seniority to claim jobs that may be somewhat
less demanding.196 The likelihood of certain injuries, such as carpal
tunnel syndrome and other cumulative traumas, is increased by the
193. For instance, 78% of the randomly selected group of workers surveyed at the Gen
eral Motors-Suzuki CAMI lean production facility reported that they worked harder than
workers in "traditional" auto plants. See CAMI REPORT, supra note 154, at 23. Workers at
Nissan's Smyrna, Tennessee plant have described their work as "eight hours of aerobics."
Carl H.A. Dassbach, Lean Production, Labor Control, and Post-Fordism in the Japanese
Automobile Industry, in NORTii AMERICAN AUTo UNIONS JN CRISIS 19, 28 (William C.
Green & Ernest J. Yanarella eds., 1996); see also W. Lewchuck & D. Robertson, Production

Without Empowerment: Work Reorganization from the Perspective ofMotor Vehicle Workers,

63 CAPITAL & CLASS 37 (1997) (reporting on worker perceptions of work intensity at Gen
eral Motors, Ford, Chrysler, and CAMI).
Japanese auto companies utilizing lean production have had increasing difficulties recruit
ing workers. A large survey of Japanese auto workers in 1989 found that only 4% would
clearly reco=end that their children take a job in the industry. Forty-three percent said
they would not and 43% had difficulty answering the question. The main reasons the
autoworkers gave for their hesitancy included the difficulty and intensity of the work and the
high level of overtime and holiday work. See BERGGREN, supra note 164, at 251-52. 1\vo
proponents of lean production assert that 60% of the members of the All Toyota Union are
chronically fatigued and that Japanese workers in lean production typically work hundreds of
hours more each year because of the regular demands of overtime. See M. KENNEY & R.
FLORIDA, BEYOND MAss PRODUCTION: THE JAPANESE SYSTEM AND ITS TRANSFER TO THE
U.S. 10 (1993).
194. See Babson, supra note 158, at 12. A local union's survey in 1992 of 1,000 workers at
the General Motors-Suzuki lean production joint venture in Ontario found that only half
thought they could stay healthy and reach retirement age if the intensity of their work
continued.
The Mazda workers' fears that they could not continue their pace until retirement seem
confirmed by the experience of auto workers in Japan. The practice of the Japanese
automakers has been to move older workers out to the lower paying jobs of suppliers con
trolled by the main producers.
195. See SATosm KAMA.TA, JAPAN JN THE PASSING LANE (1980) (cited in Tomaney, supra
note 176, at 37).
196. See FucJNI & FucJNI, supra note 156, at 97; Adler, supra note 145, at 140 (quoting
interview with Rick Madrid, Team Leader, Quality Control, NUMMI, Fremont, CA (1987)).
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frequency of repetitive movements under lean production.197 The
likelihood of injuries from machine breakdowns is augmented by
the reduction in the number and skills of maintenance workers.198
Moreover, it is likely that most workers prefer having the intensity
of their effort being monitored only by limited and identifiable
agents, rather than by all their co-workers, themselves under great
pressure to maintain a torrid work pace.199

197. See FucINI & FuCINI, supra note 156, at 178-82. An independent study of Michigan
workers' compensation records by the Detroit Free Press found that the rate of serious inju
ries at Mazda's Flat Rock lean production plant was triple the general rate for General Mo
tors and Ford. See Babson, supra note 158, at 13 (citing Jane Daugherty et al., Danger Rises
in New Auto Jobs, DETROIT FREE PRESs, July 7, 1990, at lA [hereinafter Danger Rises]). The
study was conducted during a period of peak production at Mazda, but there are similar
reports from other lean production plants in the United States. See BERGGREN, supra note
164, at 52-53 (citing Danger Rises, supra); GRAHAM, supra note 161, at 86-93. Some of the
worst stories, for instance, are about the Nissan plant in Smyrna, Tennessee, where the high
rate of injuries and intense work caused one manager to quit after he became convinced that
Nissan effectively was exhausting workers in a few years. See PARKER & SLAUGHTER, supra
note 166, at 220-21.
Based on a more recent study of what he acknowledges to be an "unimpressive" record
on injuries from repetitive stress at NUMMI, even Professor Adler concludes that aspects of
the "Toyota Production System," including "short-cycle jobs performed in a standardized way
and without any 'wasted' seconds of inactivity" may be partially responsible. See Paul S.
Adler et al., Ergonomics, Employee Involvement, and the Toyota Production System: A Case
Study of NUMMI's 1993 Model Introduction, 50 INDus. & LAB. REL. REv. 416, 432-33
(1997).
198. See PARKER & SLAUGHTER, supra note 166, at 184-87.
199. Adler reports that NUMMI's workers have a low absenteeism rate,

a high rate of
participation in a suggestion program, and a high rate of satisfaction with work. See Adler,
supra note 145, at 130. The low absenteeism at least in part may be explained by a strict no
fault attendance policy. See id. at 126. Participation in the suggestion program may be in
duced by supervisory pressure. It is difficult to evaluate Adler's claims about job satisfaction
because he seems to have spoken only to managers and a handful of workers. See id. at 11517. It is also not clear why Adler rejects the likelihood that semiskilled workers with little
formal education and little prospect of finding alternative employment at comparable wages
would be affected by NUMMI's extensive efforts to sell their system to the workers. See id.
at 130-31. NUMMI hired many workers from the old General Motors Fremont plant who
could not find comparable jobs until NUMMI gave them a second chance. See BERGGREN,
supra note 164, at 40.
A close reading of Adler's report reveals that the few workers he interviewed agreed that
they are working harder and more intensely, but accept this condition because they are con
vinced that international competition demands such work and because they have been con
vinced their opinion is valued. See Adler, supra note 145, at 145-46. In addition, the
NUMMI workers undoubtedly felt a part of something new that became economically suc
cessful, have thus far seen promises of job security fulfilled, and at least initially had requests
for amenities like a robot for installing a spare tire promptly approved. See id. at 151. That
lean production is a bitter pill is not contradicted by Adler's own claims, based on his ran
dom, limited interviewing, that NUMMI workers embraced their jobs because greater stand
ardization of their work at least made them feel "competent" and because of a "Freudian"
"reality principle" (they believed if they did not, the cold reality was that competitors would
take their jobs). See Adler, supra note 145, at 169-71.
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A Potential Role for Section 8(a) (2) in a World of
Lean Production

The NLRA in general and section 8(a)(2) in particular do not
prohibit employers from implementing lean production systems
that more effectively extract information from employees and then
use that information to demand more intense and controlled work.
Section 8(a)(2), however, does help serve the NLRA's goal of pro
tecting the development of collective employee resistance to such
systems. The NLRA allows employers to offer any working condi
tions that they wish, but it also empowers workers to join together
to attempt to demand better conditions.
Thus, the inherent unattractiveness of the lean production sys
tem, as described above, is relevant to section 8(a) (2) because such
a system places a premium on breaking employee resistance to
strict management control. Section 8(a)(2) may be critical in an era
of lean production to the extent that it can inhibit the use of
management-controlled employee involvement to undermine the
development of employee autonomy. The nature of lean produc
tion suggests that quality circles, or some other type of advisory off
line employee-involvement committees, are important not only for
the extraction of employee knowledge, but also to control em
ployee autonomy and to engender employee commitment to the
system. Worker commitment is especially important within lean
production, because, as Womack, Jones, and Roos stress, the buf
ferless nature of the system makes it "fragile" and vulnerable.200
With limited inventories and no extra manning or time to buffer
breakdowns, the system is dependent on the willingness of workers
to compensate with extra effort, perhaps on different tasks. Work
slow-downs in one area can quickly affect a plant's entire
operation.201

200. See WoMAcK ET AL., supra note 66, at 102-03. Other accounts also have noted that
bufferless production and just-in-time delivery of parts make plants more vulnerable to
strikes. See, e.g., In Wake of G.M. Strike, a Bolder "Big Labor, " CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
July 30, 1998, at 1 (noting that "labor strife can shut down numerous plants within minutes")
(quoting Danny Hoffman, University of Michigan Institute of Labor and Industrial Rela
tions); Donald W. Nauss, Progressive Parts Management Left G.M. Vulnerable, L.A. TIMES,
July 8, 1998, at Dl; Floyd Norris, Did You Notice? There's an Automobile Strike, N.Y. TIMES,
July 23, 1998, at Al.
201. "Because a JIT plant cannot draw on backup inventories, any worker who does not
complete his or her job cycle on time interrupts the flow of parts and supplies, throwing off
the entire production process." FucINI & FuCINI, supra note 156, at 40.
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Some evidence suggests that lean production therefore results in
a denser staffing of shop floor management.202 At the same time,
however, lean production's oppressiveness and fragility renders
more valuable the use of management-controlled employee com
mittees to stifle employee dissent through the above noted tech
niques,203 including the identification and isolation of dissidents and
the dividing of small groups of workers from other. small groups.204
To the extent that team le_aders are controlled by management and
thus function as the modem equivalent of "straw bosses," these
techniques also can be used in tandem with the traditional tools of
favoritism.205
Moreover, lean production may make more important the use
of employee committees to induce workers to identify with man
agement and its goals.206 This is a primary purpose of the training
for participation in quality circles.207 Management-trained team
leaders also use meetings to solicit workers' opinions in a manner
that enables the workers to feel that they have contributed to a final
decision management has already made.2os In Japan the contin
gency of a significant portion of wages on supervisors' evaluations
of productivity,209 and the associated defeat of any independent la202. See, e.g., BERGGREN, supra note 164, at 32; Norbert Altmann, Japanese Work Policy:
Opportunity, Challenge or Threat?, in ENRICHING PRODUCTION 329, 341 (Ake Sandberg ed.,
1995) (noting that the number of supervisors in Japanese manufacturing is relatively high);
Lewchuck & Robertson, supra note 193 (discussing closer monitoring in lean production
plant in Canada).
203.

See supra text accompanying notes 115-28.
supra note

204. See, e. g., PARKER & SLAUGIITER,
Nissan plant in Smyrna, Tennessee).

166, at 223 (discussing example from

205. See Barenberg, supra note 6, at 908-09 (citing sources); RrNEHART ET AL., supra note
154, at 106.
206. See, e. g., GRAHAM, supra note 161, at 106-08 (describing attempts "to shape work
ers' culture through the team structure").
207.

See, e.g., FucINI & FucINI, supra note

156, at 137.

208. See id. at 137-38. Management may encourage a quality circle to examine a problem
that has an obvious solution in order to have the workers feel that they have participated in
plant management and thereby become more invested in managerial goals. See CAMI
REPORT, supra note 154, at 37 (offering possible example).
The Japanese use other techniques to discourage workers from identifying themselves as
"non-management." These techniques include management's use of co=on uniforms, com
mon parking areas, and co=on cafeterias with front-line workers, as well as informal
management-worker dialogues. In addition, front-line workers are given titles such as pro
duction or maintenance "associate." See CAMI REPORT, supra note 154, at 1; FucINI &
FucINI, supra note 156, at 41-43.
209. See Altmann, supra note 202, at 344-45; Babson, supra note 158, at 20, 20
- n.20 (citing
sources).
The importers of the Japanese system to the United States, including NUMMI and
Mazda-Flat Rock, generally have not adopted the Japanese discretionary pay structure. An
acco=odation to American culture and union pressure, for instance, caused both NUMMI
and Mazda-Flat Rock to adopt an egalitarian wage structure. However, supervisors' author-
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bor movement,210 made the 'commitment generating' function of
quality circles less important.211 In the United States, however, buf
ferless, lean production can be threatened by the deterioration of
an associated employee-involvement system.212
The importance of breaking down any employee resistance to
the lean production system was surely understood by Japanese
management when it moved to introduce that system in North
America in the 1980s. The Japanese understood that the depen
dence of the stress-ridden lean production system on the willing co
operation of employees is potentially a more serious problem when
workers are organized in a strong independent union which could
lead employee resistance.213 Thus, having implemented lean proity over job assignments and over the implementation of work rules on issues like absences
and tardiness is not cabined effectively by collective agreement, and the favoritism this al
lows, see Adler, supra note 145, at 151-53, provides management with an effective incentive
to induce compliant worker behavior. See FucINI & FucINI, supra note 156, at 140-41.
210. Japanese companies defeated the independent labor movement in the late 1940s and
early 1950s. Major companies refused to bargain with independent national unions, recog
nizing instead "second unions," led by an identified core of cooperative workers and repre
senting only workers at a single firm. The key battle in the auto industry took place in 1953
at Nissan, when an independent union challenged management's right "unilaterally to order
overtinie and reassign labor." BERGGREN, supra note 164, at 25. A "second union," loyal to
Nissan, was formed and recognized. The national auto workers' union was dissolved in 1954.
See id. at 24-25; see also John Price, Lean Production at Suzuki and Toyota: A Historical
Perspective, in LEAN WoRK 81, 96-97 (Steve Babson ed., 1995); Tomaney, supra note 176, at
38; Yamamoto Kiyoshi, Labor-Management Relations at Nissan Motor Co. , Ltd. (Datsun),
1980 ANNALS OF THE INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 24. Yamamoto describes how the lead
ers of the enterprise union at Nissan kept power through votes registered in front of manag
ers and shop stewards, see id. at 29-30, and avoided strikes or even contentious bargaining by
moderating their proposals to those that management was prepared to grant, see id. at 31.
211. Some ascribe the success of lean production in Japan to its retention of some of the
aspects of feudal culture, including a heavy valuation of self-sacrifice and respect for author
ity. See, e. g., FuCINI & FucIN1, supra note 156, at 41.
The acceptance of lean production by Japanese workers may also have been eased by
proinises of lifetime employment from large employers like Toyota. At least until the last
few years, large Japanese employers have been able to keep such promises because of the
expanding market for their goods, the use of second-class temporary workers not given the
same proinises, the extensive use of overtime, and the increased outsourcing of work during
periods of high production. Greater job security for the aggregate work force is not a compo
nent of lean production.
212. The Mazda-Flat Rock plant provides an example. The failure of the employee
involvement program there contributed to the success of a dissident movement, hostile to
aspects of the lean production system, within the United Auto Workers local there. See
FucINI & FucINI, supra note 156, at 192-210. This election ultimately resulted in the negotia
tion of a new collective bargaining agreement that modified the system in ways that may
result in some real worker empowerment. See Babson, supra note 158, at 17-19 (noting that
team leaders are elected and subject to recall). See also RINEHART ET AL., supra note 154, at
84 (describing how Canadian Auto Workers negotiated buffers to soften lean production at

CAMI).
213. For instance, Ohno Taichi, the father of the Toyota Production System, once stated
that he "!night have been murdered" had he attempted the system's intensification of work in
the presence of an independent American union in the 1950s. See Price, supra note 210, at
98.
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duction in their Japanese plants with cooperative enterprise unions,
the Japanese auto manufacturers preferred to operate nonunion
plants in the United States.214 When they opened new plants at
rural "greenfield" sites, such as the Nissan plant in Smyrna,
Tennessee, they selected carefully a work force not favorable to un
ions from a large pool of workers who had not had other opportuni
ties to earn comparable wages.215 After the initiation of lean
production in these plants, employee-involvement programs have
been part of the strategy to avoid subsequent union organization.216
Furthermore, employee-involvement programs have been used
in ways other than the discouragement of unionization to break
down employee resistance to lean production. Such programs have
even been implemented for this purpose in unionized plants. For
instance, when the Japanese manufacturers entered into joint ven
tures with American auto companies, such as General Motors at
NUMMI and Ford at Mazda-Flat Rock, that had longstanding rela
tionships with the United Auto Workers (UAW), a nonunion strat
egy was not feasible.217

Instead, the Japanese manufacturers

adopted an alternative strategy of attempting to tame the UAW
through a combination of hard initial bargaining and employee
involvement programs. Because the Japanese companies were of
fering the promise of many high paying jobs to a union threatened
by the decline of American auto manufacturers, the companies'
hard bargaining for the relaxation of work rules, such as job classifi
cations, that would hinder lean production was basically success
ful.21s Forcing the relaxation of work rules and other contractual
concessions, however, could not ensure cooperative unions. To
avert union resistance, the Japanese manufacturers also induced the
unions to accept the kind of employee-involvement programs that
had been part of the lean production system in the Japanese, enter
prise-union work place.
The type of employee-involvement program that is protected by
section 8(a)(2) from managerial control under the definition of a
labor organization in section 2(5) of the Act219 can affect the capac
ity of the leadership of an incumbent union to oppose manage214. See FucINr & FuCINI, supra note 156, at 14.
215. The first 2000 Nissan employees were selected after extensive interviewing and testing from a pool of 130,000 applicants. See PARKER & SLAUGHTER, supra note 166, at 219.
216. See id. at 223.
217. See FucINI & FuCINI, supra note 156, at 7-9, 15; Adler, supra note 145, at 117, 119.
218. See Fucoo & FuCINI, supra note 156, at 17-18; Adler, supra note 145, at 117-19.
219. See supra text accompanying notes 18-58.
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ment's control of labor.220 Off-line employee committees, such as
quality circles, provide employees at a unionized work site with a
mechanism for influencing firm policy that is an alternative to the
traditional mechanism offered by the union. Management can ma
nipulate this alternative to make it look more effective than tradi
tional collective bargaining. For instance, management may quickly
respond to every simple grievance voiced during a quality circle
meeting, while diverting all the difficult grievances that it intends to
resist to the formal collectively bargained grievance process.221 On
the other hand,

if

the union concentrates on traditional collective

issues such as wages and fringe benefits during collective bargaining
and allows the quality circles to treat new topics like the introduc
tion of new technology or work rules, the union can seem less and
less relevant to the predominant concerns of many workers.
Management can magnify this effect by appointing union
represented employees to serve as group or team "facilitators" or
"coordinators" or "leaders." Whatever the term used, and whether
or not the union participates in the appointment of the facilitators,
management can use extensive training, the incentives of further
promotions and perquisites, and its control of resources available to
the facilitators' groups, to induce these employees to embrace man
agement's goals and perspectives.222 Many other employees, how
ever, may perceive the facilitators not as management, but as role
models who are able to address problems more effectively than
union stewards.
Union stewards may try to make their union seem more signifi
cant by attending and participating in quality circle meetings, but
this course is also fraught with danger. Management, through its
control of the agenda of such meetings and through its superior
knowledge of the company and its superior resources, can make
stewards seem ill-prepared and ineffectual. Stewards may have par
ticular difficulty countering this because they are responsible for
220. The TEAM Act, at least in its current incarnation, however, would not apply when
there is an incumbent union representative.
221. See Defense Logistics Agency, No. 9 CA 20241, 1982 WL 23451, at *10 (FLRA Dec.
("It is evident that if employees can get a quick response from management on
issues raised in quality circles, they will naturally channel their work-related concerns to the
quality circles, rather than through the resources provided in the collective bargaining agree
ment."); see also Robert B. McKersie et al., The Changing Role of Union Leaders 22 (Alfred
P. Sloan School of Management Working Paper No. 1964-87, 1987) ("Those [grievances] that
are filed tend to concern issues that are particularly difficult to resolve. As the grievance
procedure becomes more limited in scope, the result is a potentially more contentious
system.").
-

-

28, 1982)

222. See MIKE PARKER, lNsIDE

THE

CIRCLE 37-40 (1985).
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workers in many teams and cannot attend all meetings. They there
fore may often seem like outsiders at team meetings. Stewards who
try to keep the union totally involved in all quality circle activity
may find themselves exhausted with no time to discharge tradi
tional union duties, such as grievance processing.
Furthermore, management can cause a steward and her union to
seem to be an obstacle to worker goals by moving a quality circle to
propose an idea that has negative consequences for other workers
in the bargaining unit, as well as for principles embodied in the col
lective agreement. On the one hand,

if

the steward supports the

suggestion, workers in other work areas may resent the union.223
On the other hand,

if

the steward raises an objection, the union

seems to become the problem rather than the solution for the first
group of workers.
Moreover, to the extent management can use small quality cir
cles to define workers' needs narrowly and in opposition to the
needs of workers in other small groups, the union's ability to pres
ent itself as a representative of a unified bargaining unit is generally
undermined.224 Management also can use quality circles to divide
workers who participate from those who do not. The nonpartici
pants may resent the participants for currying management's favor.
The participants, who may view the nonparticipants as obstruction
ists and trouble makers, may support setting aside union-negotiated
principles like seniority that protect against favoritism.225

IV.

CONCLUSION - SECTION

8(A)(2)

AS

A STIMULANT

OF

REAL

EMPLOYEE lNvOLVEMENT

In sum, the critics of section 8(a)(2) are wrong to claim that
modem employee-involvement programs pose no threat to Ameri
can workers comparable to the pre-Wagner Act company union
movement. Modem programs, like their pre-Wagner Act anteced
ents, are often designed and used to secure greater managerial con223. See WELLS, supra note 68, at 87.
224. See id. at 113.
225. See id. at 96-97. One empirical study found that employee-involvement programs in
which incumbent unions are not involved decrease employee union satisfaction and involve
ment. See Anil Verma & R.B. McKersie, Employee Involvement: The Implications of
Noninvolvement by Unions, 40 !Nnus. & LAB. REL. REv. 556 (1987). Other research also
suggests that by becoming a joint sponsor of an employee-involvement program, a union may
actually increase employee satisfaction with and involvement in the union. Anil Verma, Joint
Participation Programs: Self-Help or Suicide for Labor?, 28 lNDus. REL. 401 (1989). This
research may suggest that many unions are meeting the challenges noted in the text, but the
research does not consider the long-run impact on unions' ability to provide an independent
voice and initiative for workers.

2376

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 96:2322

trol of the work force, perhaps through the avoidance of an
independent union movement or other forms of collective em
ployee resistance to managerial control, perhaps through the neu
tralization of an incumbent independent union. Most significantly,
employee involvement has been used as part of a new system of
'lean production' that represents an accentuation of the principles
of Taylorism and managerial control that many critics of section
8(a)(2) laud modem employers for transcending.
Proponents of employee involvement might respond in two
ways. First, they might argue that regardless of its relationship to
Taylorism and its impact on employees, lean production must be
embraced by American employers who hope to remain competitive
in the global market place. If employee-involvement programs that
are impeded by section 8(a)(2) are a necessary part of lean produc
tion, then section 8(a)(2) must be modified to allow American em
ployers to

be comp etitive.

The second, and somewhat

contradictory, response might be that not all modem employee
involvement programs are associated with efforts of senior manage
ment to obtain greater control of the work force. Even if some
modem programs, like those of the pre-Wagner Act company un
ions, are implemented for purposes of extending managerial con
trol, some modem programs also in fact represent an effort to
motivate and utilize the minds of more employees by actually dele
gating decisionmaking authority.
The first argument of course in part rests on the economic claim
that lean production represents the best way for American employ
ers to compete globally. In fact, there is mixed evidence to support
this claim. A close study of the NUMMI plant in 1986 found im
pressive productivity and quality gains over traditional American
auto manufacturing plants,226 and the authors of

The Machine That

Changed the World concluded that the extent of adoption of lean
production explains variations in productivity and quality in auto
assembly plants throughout the world.227 However, there is no
strong empirical evidence that total quality management techniques
have been generally successful outside the automobile industry.228
226. See John Krafcik, Leaming from
gram Working Paper, 1986).

NUMMI

(MIT International Motor Vehicle Pro

227. See WoMACK ET AL., supra note 66, at 75-103. But see Dan Jonsson, Lean produc
tion in the automobile industry: Second thoughts, in ENRICHING PRODUCTION, supra note

202, at 367, 370-74 (challenging the conclusions of the Womack study and noting flaws in its
methodology, including its failure to consider overtime).

228. Most claims about enhancements of productivity from employee involvement are
based on anecdotal reports or surveys of managers. See, e.g., EDWARD F. LAWLER ET AL.,
EMPLOYEE lNvoLVEMENT AND TOTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT (1992). Moreover, as noted
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Some surveys suggest that a clear majority of firms have not real
ized significant results from the use of these techniques.229 It may
be that lean production's application of Taylorism is only effective
in industries in which standardized and restricted jobs dominate.230
Moreover, even within such industries, it is not clear that all as
pects of the total quality management system, including those that
impinge on the work pace and autonomy of workers, contribute
substantially to the productivity gains. One study of American au
tomobile plants in the 1980s concluded that the most important de
terminant of productivity was the intensity of plant capacity
utilization.231 Another major study of Swedish bus and car assem
bly plants in the 1970s and 1980s concluded that these plants' efforts
to escape Taylorism with long cycle times for workers and truly au
tonomous work teams were compatible with world class competi
tion.232 The author concluded that some aspects of the Japanese
management system, such as the close collaboration with suppliers
and the use of statistical analysis to discover deviations from consis
tent quality, can be adopted without
the regressive working conditions in the Japanese system, including
the widespread fragmentation and intense machine pacing of human
tasks; the rigid demands to fulfill production quotas in all parts of the
tightly coupled system, which require unconditional employee flexi
bility, including a willingness to work overtime on very short notice;
the close surveillance of the individual and excessive regimentation of
the workplace; and the failure to adapt the working environment,
ergonomic conditions, and work pace to long-term human
requirements.233

Furthermore, even a demonstration that lean production in
creases productivity by accelerating work pace and enhancing man
agement flexibility to assign overtime and layoff and transfer
above, see, e.g., Jonsson, supra note 227 at 367, 370-74, research on employee involvement
and productivity generally has been inconclusive because of methodological limitations. See
Kelley & Harrison, supra note 135, at 258-59.

229. Of 500 U.S. firms surveyed by Arthur D. Little, only one-third reported that their
TQM programs had a significant impact on their competitiveness. Of 100 British companies
surveyed by A.T. Kearney, only one-fifth reported that their TQM program had produced

tangible results.

See The Total Quality Muddle, supra note 141, at 67.
230. See BERGGREN, supra note 164, at 247.
231. See Daniel Luria, Work Organization and Manufacturing Performance in the U.S.
Automotive Sector, 1982-1992, in DIE ZuKUNFT DER A.RBErr IN DER AUTOMOBILINDUSTRIE
299, 316 (1988); see also id. at 312-16.
232. See BERGGREN, supra note 164, at 241-43, 248-49.
233. Id. at 251; see also Jonsson, supra note 227, at 374-78 (suggesting that the superior

productivity of Japanese automobile plants can be accounted for by the manufacturability of
their products, by their level of automation, and by the selection and effort of workers, with
out placing further weight on other aspects of the production system).
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workers does not make a strong case for weakening section
8(a)(2).234 To the extent that employee-involvement programs en
able management to obtain employee acceptance of greater mana
gerial control, they may contribute to at least short-run productivity
for these reasons. But the same would be true of a paradigmatic
company union prohibited by section 8(a)(2), or for that matter of a
range of coercive and discriminatory employer actions to discour
age unions condemned by other provisions of the NLRA. Nothing
in the NLRA, including section 8(a)(2), prevents an employer from
attempting to convince its workers that the onerous aspects of lean
production are necessary in order for its business to be able to com
pete.235 The NLRA simply condemns particular coercive, discrimi
natory, and manipulative methods of persuasion.
There is, moreover, an even more fundamental flaw in the argu
ment that employee-involvement programs must be allowed to op
erate unrestrained in order to facilitate the implementation of lean
production systems that can insure American competitiveness. Re
gardless of how the NLRA is weakened, it seems doubtful that an
American blue collar work force, sharing a middle class culture
with more privileged professional and managerial workers, will ever
be as docile as the blue collar work force in developing countries.
Any strategy to enhance American competitiveness through the as
sertion of greater control over the American worker seems doomed
to failure because this strategy can be better used by less developed
countries. The increasing resistance in Japan to the lean production
system236 reflects the higher expectations brought about by eco
nomic development and belies the claim that the harsher aspects of
lean production are the necessary wave of the future in industrial
ized countries.
Many proponents of modem employee-involvement programs
would agree that it is in the long-run interest of the American econ
omy and polity to create more jobs that engage the intellect of
234. Not surprisingly, some research on the auto industry does suggest that a faster pace
of work and greater management control over the allocation of overtime, layoffs, and trans
fers increase productivity. See Katz et al., supra note 138.
235. Indeed, § 8(c) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1994), protects any such noncoercive
speech from being treated as an unfair labor practice.
236. See, e.g., BERGGREN, supra note 164, at 251-52; Kazuo Sugeno, Japan: The State's
Guiding Role in Socioeconomic Development, 14 CoMP. LAB. L.J. 302 {1993). Indeed, at

least until the recession of the early 1990s in Japan worsened, Toyota itself was suffering from
a labor shortage and high turnover and started to take steps to soften the impact of its system
on workers. See Paul Lillrank, Social Preconditions For Lean Management and Its Further
Development, in ENRICHING PRODUCTION, supra note 202, at 427, 429; Koichi Shimizu,

Humanization of the Production System and Work at Toyota Motor Co. and Toyota Motor
Kyushu, in ENRICHING PRODUCTION, supra note 202, at 383, 389.
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American workers by providing more collective and individual au
tonomy and requiring deeper skills. These proponents might re
spond to the above description of the use of employee involvement
in the modem lean production system by claiming that this also
presents an incomplete and thus distorted picture of employee in
volvement in firm decisionmaking. In their view, there has been at
some work sites a real delegation of decisionmaking authority. from
management to groups or teams of front-line workers as well as an
associated enrichment of work for many employees.
Given the broad brush typically used to describe examples of
employee involvement, it is difficult to evaluate the claim that it has
often resulted in the actual empowerment of workers or the enrich
ment of jobs. There are many reports of some delegation to work
teams of authority over such decisions as work allocati�n, hiring,
compensation, and in some cases even work design.237 In most in
stances, however, the teams seem to be directed by a management
trained and controlled leader.238 Moreover, there has been scant
documentation of teams being given the discretion to escape
Taylorism by designing work to enhance the autonomy of individual
workers over their work pace or to reduce the repetitiveness of
jobs.

The now-closed Volvo car assembly plant in Uddevalla,

Sweden, where teams of only a few workers would assemble an en
tire car in about two hours, for instance, seems to have no North
American heavy manufacturing analogue.239
?:37. See, e.g., APPELBAUM & BArr, supra note 109, at 85-88, 136-43; BARRY BLUESTONE
& IRVING BLUESTONE, NEGOTIATING TiiE FUTURE 174-79 (1992).
?:38.

See APPELBAUM

& BArr, supra note 107, at 87.

239. See BERGGREN, supra note 164, at 148-55. Uddevalla represented the most exten
sive attempt of the Swedish automotive industry to provide more appealing working condi
tions to attract a more stable work force in the tight Swedish labor markets of the 1970s and
1980s. See id. at 10-14. Berggren concludes from his rigorous surveys of workers at five of
the other innovative plants "that the content of basic production tasks is of decisive impor
tance for workers. . . . The further from traditional line assembly a plant moves, the better the
outcomes in terms of variation, prospects for personal growth, the taking of responsibility,
and the opportunity to use one's skills." Id. at 242. For other descriptions of the Uddevalla
plant's "Reflective Production System," see ENRICHING PRooucnoN, supra note 202, at 37,
104 (collecting papers on Volvo's innovative Uddevalla and Kalmar plants).
Uddevalla was not closed because its production design could not be competitive with
lean production. The prospects for Uddevalla reaching the productivity of Volvo's most effi
cient plant were good. Moreover, Berggren argues that Volvo's general performance gap
with the Japanese could have been closed by improving the manufacturability of its parts and
by improving the quality of its components industry. BERGGREN, supra note 164, at 164-65.
'
In any event, Volvo's decision to close the Uddevalla plant in 1993 derived from a decline in
the demand for Volvos and the political pressures from the Swedish auto workers' union to
keep older, larger plants in operation. See APPELBAUM & BArr, supra note 107, at 32-33;
Ake Sandberg, The Uddevalla Experience in Perspective, in ENRICHING PRooucnoN, supra
note 202, at 1, 9-13.
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The General Motors experiment at Saturn, trumpeted as the
showcase of American employee involvement through autonomous
work teams, does allow work teams to elect their own leaders and
to have control over work assignments and scheduling and such
personnel matters as hiring, vacation approvals, and absenteeism.24 0
However, the Saturn plant uses Japanese-style just-in-time assem
bly line production.241 The praise of Saturn has included no discus
sion of work teams at Saturn having authority to enrich the jobs or
enhance the autonomy of individual workers.242
The limits on the delegation of decisionmaking authority
through American team production are highlighted by a study of
relatively autonomous teams of production workers at a plant of an
integrated manufacturer of electronics and aerospace equipment
for the Department of Defense.243 The teams elected their own
leaders, typically for a half year period, and were given authority to
assign jobs and, within limits, to schedule work. But the teams were
not empowered to implement product design or manufacturing pro
cess changes in the interest of worker autonomy. Any proposed
changes had to be approved by managers and production engineers.
The teams were used by senior management to substitute collective
peer supervision, as "supplemented by computer-based continuous
feedback loops and reporting systems," for traditional forms of di
rect supervision.244 Jobs remained fragmented, with job enrichment
being limited to the rotation between repetitive tasks, and involve
ment in statistical quality control and team decisionmaking.24s
Proponents of employee involvement may nevertheless argue
that however bounded at most American workplaces, the delega
tion of some degree of authority to front-line workers represents a
desirable democratization of the American workplace. Some infor
mal surveys of workers who have experienced American team pro-

240. See Saul Rubinstein et al., The Saturn Partnership: Co-Management and the
Reinvention of the Local Union, in EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION: ALTERNATIVES AND
FuruRE DIRECTIONS 339, 343 (Bruce E. Kaufman & Morris M. Kleiner eds., 1993).
241. See .APPELBAUM & BArr, supra note 107, at 209.
242. In any event, General Motors has taken no steps to expand on its Saturn experi
ment, apparently instead viewing NUMMI as its model for future plants. See Keith
Bradsher, G.M.'s Plant in Brazil Raises Fears Closer to Home, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 1998, at
Al; Keith Bradsher, Labor's Peace with G.M. Unraveling at Saturn Plant, N.Y. TIMES, July
22, 1998, at Al.
243. See Klein & Kraft, supra note 141.
244. See id. at 28.
245. See id. at 33-35.
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duction, including Paul Adler's interviews at NUMMI,246 suggest
that at least some American workers value the feelings of greater
involvement in firm management afforded by even tightly con
trolled work teams.247 Workers may prefer the enhanced responsi
bilities of coll e ctive s elf-supervision, even when those
responsibilities do not enable individual workers to achieve greater
autonomy or enriched experiences at work.
Furthermore, the proponents of employee involvement can ar
gue that the level of democratization of the American work place is
both varied and dynamic. Whatever the dominant model today, it
may be that American management will gradually come to appreci
ate that it is in their interest to delegate more and more authority to
cooperative work teams.248 There is indeed some evidence that in
creasing the autonomy of individual workers and returning to a
higher skilled quasi-craft mode of production may provide many
manufacturers with a competitive advantage.249

Recent tech

nological advances can be used not only to enhance central man
agement's ability to control and monitor workers,250 but also to en246. See Adler, supra note 145, at 174 ("[W]hen workers can establish a feeling of organi
zation-wide responsibility for the effectiveness of their work, they will accept sacrifices of
individual autonomy and even sacrifices of work-group autonomy. . . . Autonomy is the ab
sence of external constraint; but the more important factor behind motivation and satisfac
tion might be the obverse - self-efficacy . . . .").
247. See Richard Freeman & Joel Rogers, What Do Workers Want? Voice, Representation
and Power in the American Workplace, 1998 PRoc. N.Y.U. 50ni .ANN. CoNF. ON LAB. (Sa
muel Estreicher ed., forthcoming).
248. There is some limited empirical support for team production yielding productivity
gains in the United States. See, e.g., Joel Cutcher-Gershenfeld, The Impact on Economic
Performance of a Transformation in Workplace Relations, 44 !Nous. & LAB. REL. REv. 241
(1991) (study of Xerox).
249. This is the theme of Michael Piore's and Charles Sabel's widely discussed book, The
Second Industrial Divide, see P10RE & SABEL, supra note 63. They cite, for instance, the
example of mini-mills in the German steel industry where "workers are given basic courses in
metallurgy and plant operation and briefly apprenticed in all the mill's operating units before
they receive intensive theoretical and practical instruction in the area in which they will even
tually work." Id. at 210. The success of German manufacturing plants relative to those in
Britain and France has been attributed to the use of higher skilled workers in Germany. See
Paul Attewell, Skill and Occupational Changes in U.S. Manufacturing, in TECHNOLOGY AND
THE FUTURE OF Woruc 46, 71 (Paul S. Adler ed., 1992); see also Peter J. Senker, Automation
and Work in Britain, in TECHNOLOGY AND THE FUTURE OF WORK, supra, at 89. The utiliza
tion of comparatively high skill levels in Germany has been attributed to the strength of the
German labor movement and its use of the independent works council system. See
APPELBAUM & BArr, supra note 107, at 41-42.
250. See SHAIKEN, supra note 150, at 177-90 (describing computer systems that provide
management with detailed reports on all movements of workers, "bringing the equivalent of
assembly line discipline to those jobs that were technically impossible to police fully before").
Klein & Kraft, supra note 141, also describe how computers are used by central management
to monitor more closely the compliance of workers with rigid task specifications. See id. at
28.
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the

firm.251
These arguments do not, however, establish a case for the weak
ening of section 8(a)(2). What they suggest is that American em
ployers can frame decisionmaking systems and production design in
technologically modem plants either to enrich or to devalue the
work experience of their employees. Employee-involvement pro
grams can provide a real step toward democratization of the work
place, or they can be used to facilitate the further intensification,
standardization, and fragmentation of work.
Section 8(a) (2), and the definition of labor organization in sec
tion 2(5) on which it depends, has been interpreted, consonant with
the underlying principles of the Act, to discourage the latter choice.
Section 8(a)(2) thwarts the use of employee-involvement programs
to inhibit concerted worker resistance to a management controlled
work place, without also prohibiting the delegation of real authority
to groups of workers. Section 8(a)(2) allows management to allo
cate managerial authority in any way it chooses; it allows manage
ment to solicit individual employee voice on personnel issues and
individual or collective employee voice on other managerial issues,
such as product definition and design and quality control; and it
allows management to attempt to centralize and intensify manage
rial control over employee time. Section 8(a)(2) prohibits manage
ment only from subverting employee efforts to resist such control
by manipulating channels for collective employee voice on person251. Computerized numerical control of machines, for instance, has been used in Ger
many to enhance the skills and augment the intellectual contributions of craft workers. Ger
man firms have found advantageous the flexibility provided by having numerically controlled
machines programmed on the shop floor. See PmRE & SABEL, supra note 63, at 232-33. The
Kelley and Harrison study, supra note 135, found that in many American plants "some blue
collar machining operations" included "major programming responsibilities." Id. at 272; see
also Horst Kern & Michael Schumann, New Concepts of Production and the Emergence of
the Systems Controller, in TECHNOLOGY AND THE FUTURE OF WoRK, supra note 249, at 111,
133-35 (1992) (describing the proliferation in Germany of "systems controllers," workers re
quiring higher skills to monitor and repair machines than those of traditional mass produc
tion workers, albeit less individual autonomy than traditional craft workers).
However, numerical control of machines, like other technologies, can also be used to
centralize control and to make work less autonomous for operatives. Kelley and Harrison
found that in large multiplant enterprises "the chances of blue collar programming are very
small," and that job enrichment is not significantly associated with quality circles or other
collaborative committees. Id. at 273. Thus, in many firms, the new computerized technology
for control of machines seems to have resulted in the de-skilling of machine jobs and an
associated increase in centralized managerial control, in accord with the technology's original
marketing. See SHAIKEN, supra note 150, at 66-135; see also id. at 67 ("[N)umerical control
reflects the social criteria of design . . . : fewer skills, less worker input, and increased mana
gerial control. Once a program is tested, a high level of skill is permanently embodied in it.
That skill ceases to be the property of the worker and therefore no longer can be used at the
discretion of the machinist.").
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nel issues. Far from being outdated by contemporary develop
ments, section 8(a)(2) should remain as a central bulwark of the

NLRA both in the nonunion and the unionized work place. Ironi
cally, it is the strong, yet permissive, section 8(a)(2) that the Board
has elaborated that best serves the goals claimed by the section
8(a)(2) critics.
In my view the basic goals and compromises of the NLRA, the
statute of Theodore St. Antoine and other leading employment
lawyers of his generation, remain as relevant today as when the
statute was passed. To achieve those goals and more fully effect
those compromises the statute clearly must be modified. But a
complete picture of the contemporary workplace suggests that the
dilution of section 8(a)(2) cannot be part of that modification.

